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NOTES 
 
Terror, Tort, and the First 
Amendment 
HATFILL V. NEW YORK TIMES AND MEDIA 
LIABILITY FOR INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF 
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
“Someone must have been telling lies about Joseph K., for without 
having done anything wrong he was arrested one fine morning.”1
I. INTRODUCTION 
On the morning of August 6, 2002, CBS’s “The Early 
Show” and NBC’s “Today” broadcast a statement read by 
Attorney General John Ashcroft naming Dr. Steven Jay Hatfill 
a “person of interest” to the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) in their 
investigation into the 2001 anthrax attacks.2  While Dr. Hatfill 
was never arrested in connection with the “Amerithrax” 
investigation, the accusations against him nevertheless 
drastically impacted his life.3  The federal government 
repeatedly interrogated, monitored, and searched Dr. Hatfill, 
the press made him the subject of numerous news stories, and 
the DOJ caused him to lose a lucrative and prominent position 
in the bio-defense field.4   In a public statement on August 25, 
 1 FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 1 (Willa Muir et al. trans., Schocken Books 1995) 
(1937). 
 2 Hatfill v. Ashcroft, 404 F. Supp. 2d 104, 108 (D.D.C. 2005). 
 3 Scott Shane, In 4-Year Anthrax Hunt, F.B.I. Finds Itself Stymied, and 
Sued, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2005, at A1.  The investigation into the 2001 anthrax 
attacks was named “Amerithrax” by the FBI.  Amerithrax Links Page, 
http://www.fbi.gov/anthrax/amerithraxlinks.htm (last visited Sept. 18, 2006). 
 4 Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer (CNN television broadcast Aug. 25, 2002), 
transcript available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0208/25/le.00.html.  
Before the accusations, Dr. Hatfill held a position at Louisiana State University paying 
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2002, Dr. Hatfill expressed his considerable frustration: “My 
life is being destroyed by arrogant government bureaucrats 
who are peddling groundless innuendo and half information 
about me to gullible reporters who, in turn, repeat 
this . . . under the guise of news.”5  One reporter in particular 
drew Dr. Hatfill’s wrath—Nicholas D. Kristof of the New York 
Times (“Times”).6  Kristof wrote a series of columns spanning 
from May to August 2002, harshly criticizing the FBI for, 
among other things, not thoroughly investigating Dr. Hatfill, 
whom he named “Mr. Z.”7  Dr. Hatfill blamed Kristof and his 
allegedly irresponsible reporting in large part for his ordeal, 
which he likened in its absurdity to that of “Joseph K.” in 
Kafka’s The Trial.8  Dr. Hatfill wholeheartedly maintained his 
innocence throughout and eventually turned to the courts to 
vindicate his name, filing two lawsuits—one against Kristof 
and the Times claiming defamation and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress (“IIED”),9 and another against John 
Ashcroft, the FBI, and the DOJ claiming violations of his rights 
under the First and Fifth Amendments and the Privacy Act.10  
This Note focuses on the first suit, specifically the claim of 
IIED, the dismissal of that claim by the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia,11 its reinstatement 
  
$150,000 per year.  The Justice Department, however, funded this position and they, 
apparently, were reticent to continue lining the pockets of their “person of interest.”  
See Marilyn W. Thompson, The Persuit [sic] of Steven Hatfill, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 
2003, at W6. 
 5 Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer, supra note 4.  
 6 Id. (“Why is it necessary, right or fair, Mr. Kristoff [sic], for you to write 
these things?”). 
 7 Nicholas D. Kristof, Connecting Deadly Dots, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 2002, at 
A25 [hereinafter Kristof, Connecting Deadly Dots]; Nicholas D. Kristof, Anthrax? The 
F.B.I. Yawns, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2002, at A21 [hereinafter Kristof, The FBI Yawns]; 
Nicholas D. Kristof, The Anthrax Files, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2002, at A19 [hereinafter 
Kristof, The Anthrax Files I]; Nicholas D. Kristof, Case of the Missing Anthrax, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 19, 2002, at A17 [hereinafter Kristof, Case of the Missing Anthrax]; 
Nicholas D. Kristof, The Anthrax Files, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2002, at A19 [hereinafter 
Kristof, The Anthrax Files II]. 
 8 Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer, supra note 4.  Dr. Hatfill even sarcastically 
suggested that The Trial was Kristof’s inspiration for dubbing him “Mr. Z.”  Id. 
 9 Hatfill v. New York Times Co., 33 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1129 (E.D. Va. 
2004), rev’d, 416 F.3d 320 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1619 (2006). 
 10 Hatfill v. Ashcroft, 404 F. Supp. 2d 104, 106 (D.D.C. 2005).  Hatfill also 
sued Vassar professor and handwriting expert Donald Foster because of an article 
written by Foster in Vanity Fair expressing the conclusion, based largely on his 
analysis of the handwriting on the anthrax letters, that the FBI should focus its 
investigation on Hatfill.  See generally Hatfill v. Foster, 372 F. Supp. 2d 725 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005). 
 11 Hatfill, 33 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1129. 
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and denial of rehearing by the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit,12 and the implications presented by 
allowing such claims to proceed against the press pursuant to 
their coverage of the paramount issues of the day. 
After developing the factual landscape that gave rise to 
the Times lawsuit in Part II, Part III discusses the procedural 
history of Hatfill v. New York Times.  Part IV briefly surveys 
the development of the tort of IIED before focusing on the tort’s 
application against media defendants, paying special attention 
to the First Amendment problems that arise when plaintiffs 
use the tort to punish speech on matters of legitimate public 
concern.  Part V maintains that these problems require courts 
to adopt a newsworthiness defense to IIED, applicable at the 
pleading stage, which would account for tort law’s remedial 
objectives in compensating emotional damages while ensuring 
that the press will be free to responsibly report on public issues 
without fear of reprisal.  This Note concludes by demonstrating 
that the application of such a defense in Hatfill would have 
required the Fourth Circuit to affirm the district court’s 
dismissal. 
II. FACTS 
A. The Anthrax Attacks 
In late 2001, while the nation was still reeling from the 
terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington D.C., a 
subtle but insidious threat revealed itself in South Florida.  On 
October 4, the public learned that a photo editor named Robert 
Stevens lay dying in a West Palm Beach hospital from acute 
inhalational anthrax disease, caused by exposure to anthrax, 
one of the world’s deadliest known pathogens.13  Mr. Stevens 
died the following day, and within two days, his friend and co-
worker Ernesto Blanco—a mailroom employee at the Boca 
  
 12 Hatfill v. New York Times Co., 416 F.3d 320 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 
126 S. Ct. 1619 (2006). 
 13 Laurie Garrett, Questions Linger; Unknown Dominates Probe a Year After 
Deadly Anthrax Mailings, NEWSDAY, Oct. 7, 2002, at A7 [hereinafter Garrett, 
Questions Linger]. 
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Raton headquarters of American Media, Inc.14—fell ill from the 
same anthrax-induced affliction.15    
In the weeks that followed, a series of anthrax-laden 
letters surfaced in several conspicuous places in a manner 
clearly geared to garner public attention.  The first such letter, 
addressed to broadcaster Tom Brokaw, was discovered in the 
office of his assistant at the Manhattan headquarters of NBC 
News.16  Shortly thereafter, two more contaminated envelopes 
appeared, one addressed to the “Editor” of the New York Post, 
and then on October 15, another addressed to Senator Tom 
Daschle at his Washington D.C. office.17  Following the 
discovery of the Daschle letter, the FBI placed a large quantity 
of mail from Capitol Hill in quarantine.18  Amongst this 
sequestered mail, agents discovered another letter teeming 
with anthrax spores and addressed to Senator Patrick Leahy 
on November 16, 2001.19   
  
 14 American Media, Inc. publishes the National Enquirer.  Thompson, supra 
note 4. 
 15 Id.  The source of the anthrax that killed Mr. Stevens and sickened Mr. 
Blanco was never determined, although Mr. Stevens’ office mail slot and computer 
keyboard later tested positive for contamination.  Id.; Garrett, Questions Linger, supra 
note 13. 
 16 Laurie Garrett, The Anthrax Crisis; How a Suspected Case in NYC 
Threaded Its Way to Diagnosis Despite Initial CDC Uncertainty, NEWSDAY, Oct. 8, 
2002, at A37 [hereinafter Garrett, The Anthrax Crisis].  As the events in Florida 
unfolded, Tom Brokaw’s assistant, Erin O’Connor became certain that she had been 
exposed to anthrax.  She recalled opening an envelope addressed to Mr. Brokaw on 
September 25 and noticing a white powder within.  Several days later, she developed a 
painless, but unsightly sore on her collarbone.  Initial testing of the suspected envelope 
and Ms. O’Connor’s skin tissue was negative, but a Center for Disease Control (CDC) 
lab in Atlanta eventually concluded that her sore was the result of anthrax exposure.  
On October 12, New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani informed the city and nation of 
the CDC’s determination.  Later that day, another envelope addressed to Mr. Brokaw 
was discovered in Ms. O’Connor’s desk and was delivered to a city health department 
lab by the NYPD where it not only tested positive for anthrax, but contaminated the 
entire lab, causing the lab to be sealed shut for months following the incident.  Id.  
 17 Shane, supra note 3; Susan Schmidt, Only One Barrel of Congress Mail 
Tainted; Officials Say Batch Included Letter to Leahy, Now Under Analysis for 
Anthrax, WASH. POST, Nov. 18, 2001, at A6.  See also Press Release, FBI, Photos of 
Anthrax Letters to NBC, Senator Daschle, and NY Post (Oct. 23, 2001), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel01/102301.htm. 
 18 Schmidt, supra note 17. 
 19 Id.; Opening of the Letter: An Interview with Van A. Harp, Asst. Dir. of the 
Washington field office, FBI, http://www.fbi.gov/anthrax/vanharp/transcript.htm (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2005) [hereinafter An Interview with Van A. Harp].  The letters to NBC 
and the New York Post were postmarked September 18, while the letters to the two 
Senators were postmarked October 9 and their return address indicated they were 
mailed by a fourth grader from a fictitious “Greendale School” in Franklin Park, New 
Jersey.  Thompson, supra note 4; Schmidt, supra note 17; Press Release, supra note 17.  
The letter to Senator Daschle was dated “9-11-01” and contained a message scrawled in 
childish handwriting: 
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All four letters bore postmarks from Trenton, New 
Jersey.20  Before arriving at Capitol Hill, the letters addressed 
to the two Senators passed through the massive Brentwood 
postal distribution center in Northeast D.C. and, as a result, 
caused the deaths of two postal workers there—Joseph 
Curseen and Thomas Morris Jr.21  By the time the threat 
subsided, the anthrax attacks claimed the lives of five people 
and sickened seventeen others.22  Evidence of anthrax spores 
surfaced not only in New York, New Jersey, Washington D.C., 
and Florida, but also in places as seemingly far removed from 
the attacks as Kansas City, Missouri, and the United States 
Embassy in Vilnius, Lithuania.23
B. The FBI’s Investigation, Nicholas Kristof’s Articles, and 
Dr. Steven Hatfill’s “Emergence” as a Person of Interest 
Before the struggle in Florida for Robert Stevens’ life 
had ended, the FBI’s investigation into the source of his 
affliction had begun.24  After discovering the letters in New 
  
YOU CAN NOT STOP US. 
WE HAVE THIS ANTHRAX. 
YOU DIE NOW. 
ARE YOU AFRAID? 
DEATH TO AMERICA. 
DEATH TO ISRAEL. 
ALLAH IS GREAT. 
Press Release, supra note 17.  Senator Leahy’s letter contained a nearly identical 
message.  Opening of the Letter, Amerithrax: Seeking Information, FBI, 
http://www.fbi.gov/anthrax/vanharp/introleahy.htm (last visited Jan. 3, 2006).  While 
the envelopes addressed to Mr. Brokaw and the New York Post were without a return 
address, the letters within were also dated “9-11-01” and their message, in the same 
handwriting, was similar:  
THIS IS NEXT 
TAKE PENACILIN [sic] NOW 
DEATH TO AMERICA 
DEATH TO ISRAEL 
ALLAH IS GREAT 
Press Release, supra note 17. 
 20 Schmidt, supra note 4. 
 21 Thompson, supra note 4. 
 22 Shane, supra note 3.  The deaths of an elderly Connecticut woman, Ottilie 
Lundgren, and a hospital worker from the Bronx, Kathy Nguyen, were also determined 
to have been caused by anthrax exposure, but how they came into contact with the 
pathogen remains a mystery.  Garrett, The Anthrax Crisis, supra note 16. 
 23 Thompson, supra note 4. 
 24 Before he died, samples of Mr. Stevens’ blood were taken to a laboratory at 
Northern Arizona University in Flagstaff to be analyzed by Paul Keim, a specialist in 
bacterial evolution and caretaker of a collection of genetic variants of anthrax.  Keim’s 
 
242 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:1 
York, the FBI revealed that a variant of anthrax known as the 
“Ames” strain was being used in the attacks.25  Although it was 
initially unclear where the Ames strain originated,26 the FBI 
knew that it resembled a strain of anthrax commonly used in 
American bio-defense research and held at several military 
facilities, including the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute 
for Infectious Diseases (“USAMRIID”) at Fort Detrick, 
Maryland.27
The USAMRIID facility quickly became an important 
base of operations in the FBI’s investigation, dubbed 
“Amerithrax.”28  USAMRIID had long been a leader in the 
study of deadly biological agents; both defensively, in creating 
vaccines and treatments and also prior to 1969, offensively, in 
engineering military uses for them.29  Due to this amassed 
expertise, the FBI naturally turned to the facility to aid in its 
investigation and brought the letters addressed to Senators 
Daschle and Leahy there to be studied.30  As the Fort Detrick 
scientists opened and examined these letters, it became 
apparent that the anthrax mailer had used sophisticated 
methods to weaponize his anthrax and make it optimal for 
inhalation.31  
Based in part on these findings, the FBI offered a 
tentative outline of some of the characteristics they believed 
  
lab studied the Stevens sample, quickly identified it as the “Ames” strand and relayed 
the information to the FBI.  Debora MacKenzie, The Insider, NEW SCIENTIST, Feb. 9, 
2002, at 88 [hereinafter MacKenzie, The Insider]. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id.  In an earlier article, MacKenzie had opined that the Ames strand 
identified by Keim and the FBI referred to a variant of anthrax developed under a 
USAMRIID weapons program that was terminated in 1969.  Debora MacKenzie, Trail 
of Terror, NEW SCIENTIST, Oct. 27, 2001, at 44.  The Department of Agriculture later 
identified the Ames strand as being isolated from a Texas cow in 1981.  It was named 
Ames after a veterinary lab in Ames, Iowa that was on the return address of the 
envelopes that were used to post the sample to army scientists.  MacKenzie, The 
Insider, supra note 24. 
 27 Shane, supra note 3; MacKenzie, The Insider, supra note 24.  
 28 See Shane, supra note 3.  See also Martin Enserink, On Biowarfare’s 
Frontline: Heightened Fears of Bioterrorism Have Shone the Spotlight on the Army’s 
Biodefense Lab—and Pulled its Researchers out of Their Isolation, SCIENCE, June 14, 
2002, at 1954.  
 29 Enserink, supra note 28. 
 30 See id.  
 31 MacKenzie, The Insider, supra note 24; An Interview with Van A. Harp, 
supra note 19.  The anthrax particles in the letter were of a uniform size, highly 
concentrated with no debris, coated to prevent clumping and had been treated with an 
unusual form of silica to facilitate the drying process.  MacKenzie, The Insider, supra 
note 24. 
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the suspect possessed in a January 29, 2002 letter to the 
Members of the American Society for Microbiology: 
[A] single person is most likely responsible for these 
mailings. . . . Based on his or her selection of the Ames strain of 
Bacillus anthracis one would expect that this individual has or had 
legitimate access to select biological agents at some time. This 
person has the technical knowledge and/or expertise to produce a 
highly refined and deadly product.32
Because of USAMRIID’s expertise, history and inventory of 
Ames anthrax, some of its scientists clearly had the access and 
technical knowledge described in the FBI’s profile.33  These 
scientists seemed all the more suspicious because of Fort 
Detrick’s allegedly questionable security, specifically its 
reported loss of anthrax, ebola, and other pathogen samples 
during the early 1990’s.34   Thus, it was not surprising that the 
lab and its researchers, in addition to being a vital tool in the 
Amerithrax investigation, quickly became its prominent 
focus.35   
It was this attention on Fort Detrick that first led 
investigators to Dr. Hatfill.  Dr. Hatfill worked at USAMRIID 
from 1997 to 1999 on a fellowship studying Ebola and related 
viruses.36  Prior to that, he spent a good portion of his adult life 
in Africa pursuing various degrees and affiliating himself with 
the militaries of several countries.37  After his fellowship at 
USAMRIID expired, Hatfill landed a job at Science 
Applications International Corporation (“SAIC”), a huge 
government contractor that works closely with the CIA and 
other government agencies.38  In the summer of 2001, while 
working at SAIC, Hatfill applied for a heightened security 
clearance to work with the CIA, which required him to pass a 
  
 32 Letter from Van Harp, Asst. Dir. Washington Field Office, FBI, to 
Members of the American Society for Microbiology (Jan. 29, 2002), available at 
http://www.fas.org/bwc/news/anthraxreport.htm. 
 33 See Enserink, supra note 29. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id.  The only other government lab that received comparable attention to 
USAMRIID at the early stages of the investigation was the Army’s Dugway Proving 
Ground in Utah, which was revealed to have secretly weaponized anthrax after the 
USAMRIID program was stopped by President Nixon in 1969.  Id.; MacKenzie, supra 
note 24. 
 36 David Tell, The Hunting of Steven J. Hatfill, WKLY. STANDARD, Sept. 16, 
2002, at 21. 
 37 Thompson, supra note 4.  
 38 Id.   
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polygraph.39  Reportedly, the results of this polygraph were less 
than satisfactory and the CIA denied Hatfill’s application for 
upgraded clearance in August 2001.40  Shortly thereafter, the 
Department of Defense revoked his regular security 
clearance.41  Rightly or wrongly, Hatfill’s eccentric past, his 
connections to Fort Detrick, and the perception that he might 
be angry at the government over his security clearance placed 
him in the unenviable position of being on the FBI’s short list 
of possible suspects.42
In the beginning of 2002, Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, a 
college professor and bio-defense expert, became frustrated at 
the pace of the FBI’s investigation and began collecting 
available evidence and posting her detailed analysis of it 
online.43  After earlier posting her belief that the anthrax killer 
was likely a USAMRIID scientist, she wrote on February 5, 
2002, that “[f]or more than three months now the FBI has 
known that the perpetrator of the anthrax attacks is American.  
This conclusion must have been based on the perpetrator’s 
evident connection to the US biodefense program.”44  On 
February 25, 2002, White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer 
addressed Ms. Rosenberg’s allegations in a press briefing when 
a reporter asked if there had been a suspect for three months 
and if it was an American scientist from Fort Detrick.  After 
explaining that the FBI was still investigating several possible 
suspects, Mr. Fleischer responded, “[a]ll indications are that 
the source of the anthrax is domestic . . . [a]nd I just can’t go 
beyond that.”45   
On May 24, 2002, writing in his regular column on the 
Times’ editorial page, Nicholas Kristof did go beyond Mr. 
  
 39 Id.   
 40 Id.   
 41 Id.    
 42 Id.  
 43 Thompson, supra note 4.  Ms. Rosenberg is a professor of biology and 
environmental studies at the State University of New York (SUNY) at Purchase and 
affiliated with the Federation of American Scientists. Id.; SUNY at Purchase 
Environmental Studies Faculty, http://www.ns.purchase.edu/envsci/faculty.htm.  
 44 Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, Federation of American Scientists, Analysis of 
Anthrax Attacks, Commentary: Is the FBI Dragging its Feet? (Feb. 5, 2002), available 
at http://www.fas.org/bwc/news/anthraxreport.htm.  Ms. Rosenberg went on to analyze 
how characteristics of the initial anthrax letters and subsequent hoax letters allowed 
for “a more refined estimate of the perpetrator’s motives.  He must be angry at some 
biodefense agency or component, and he is driven to demonstrate, in a spectacular way, 
his capabilities and the government’s inability to respond.”  Id. 
 45 Press Briefing, Ari Fleischer, White House Press Secretary (Feb. 25, 2002), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020225-16.html#12. 
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Fleischer’s description.  With the stated goal of “light[ing] a fire 
under the F.B.I. in its investigation of the anthrax case,” 
Kristof wrote:  
Experts in the bioterror field are already buzzing about a handful of 
individuals who had the ability, access and motive to send the 
anthrax.  These experts point, for example, to one middle-aged 
American who has worked for the United States military bio-defense 
program and had access to the labs at Fort Detrick, Md.  His anthrax 
vaccinations are up to date, he unquestionably had the ability to 
make first-rate anthrax, and he was upset at the United States 
government in the period preceding the anthrax attacks.46
One month later, on June 24, 2002, Barbara Rosenberg and 
several FBI officials attended a closed meeting before the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, which was then chaired by 
anthrax letter recipient Senator Patrick Leahy.47  The following 
day, federal agents sought and received permission from Dr. 
Hatfill to conduct the first of several searches of his Frederick, 
Maryland apartment.48   
Shortly thereafter on July 2, 2002, the Times published 
another of Kristof’s columns criticizing the FBI’s investigation 
and calling attention to the national security threats posed by 
the bureau’s “lackadaisical ineptitude in pursuing the anthrax 
killer.”49  The column read: 
Almost everyone who has encountered the F.B.I. anthrax 
investigation is aghast at the bureau’s lethargy.  Some in the 
biodefense community think they know a likely culprit, whom I’ll 
call Mr. Z.  Although the bureau has polygraphed Mr. Z, searched his 
home twice and interviewed him four times, it has not placed him 
under surveillance or asked its outside handwriting expert to 
compare his writing to that on the anthrax letters. . . . He denies any 
wrongdoing, and his friends are heartsick at suspicions directed 
against a man they regard as a patriot.  Some of his polygraphs show 
evasion, I hear, although that may be because of his temperament. 
If Mr. Z were an Arab national, he would have been imprisoned long 
ago.  But he is a true-blue American with close ties to the U.S. 
Defense Department, the C.I.A. and the American biodefense 
program.  On the other hand, he was once caught with a girlfriend in 
a biohazard  “hot suite” at Fort Detrick, surrounded only by blushing 
germs. . . .  [I]t’s time for the F.B.I. to make a move: either it should 
  
 46 Kristof, Connecting Deadly Dots, supra note 7. 
 47 Thompson, supra note 4.  
 48 Id.  
 49 Kristof, The F.B.I. Yawns, supra note 7. 
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go after him more aggressively . . . or it should seek to exculpate him 
and remove this cloud of suspicion.50    
Kristof then went on to pose a series of questions to the FBI: 
Do you know how many identities and passports Mr. Z has and are 
you monitoring his international travel? . . . Why was his top 
security clearance suspended . . . less than a month before the 
anthrax attacks began? . . . Have you searched the isolated residence 
that he had access to last fall?  The F.B.I. . . . knows that Mr. Z gave 
Cipro to people who visited it. . . . Have you examined whether Mr. Z 
has connections to the biggest anthrax outbreak among humans ever 
recorded . . . in Zimbabwe in 1978-90?  There is evidence that the 
anthrax was released by the white Rhodesian Army . . . Mr. Z has 
claimed that he participated in the white army’s much feared Selous 
Scouts. . . . Mr. Z’s resume also claims involvement in the former 
South African Defense Force; all else aside, who knew that the U.S. 
Defense Department would pick an American who had served in the 
armed forces of two white-racist regimes to work . . . with some of 
the world’s deadliest germs?51
Kristof’s next column appeared on July 12 and it 
discussed the possibility that earlier anthrax hoaxes in 1997 
and 1999 may have been connected to the 2001 attacks.52  
Much of the column criticized the FBI’s failure to look to these 
earlier incidents to aid in their current investigation.53  
However, Kristof did mention Mr. Z again, this time in 
connection with a 1997 anthrax scare in Washington D.C.54  
Kristof noted that the incident occurred on the same day as a 
terrorism seminar held in the D.C. area.  According to Kristof, 
“Mr. Z seemed peeved that neither he nor any other bio-defense 
expert had been included as a speaker.”55  Kristof quoted a 
letter that Dr. Hatfill apparently sent to the organizer of the 
seminar in which he wrote that he was “rather concerned” at 
the omission.56  Without mentioning specifics, Kristof also 
wrote that Dr. Hatfill subsequently used the 1997 incident “to 
underscore the importance of his field and his own status 
within it,” and to demonstrate how future attacks might 
occur.57
  
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Kristof, The Anthrax Files I, supra note 7. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id.  
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
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The column also explained that the 1997 hoax involved 
a fake anthrax gelatin, while a series of letters sent to a 
combination of media and government targets in 1999 had used 
fake anthrax powder.58  Kristof found this interesting because 
“Mr. Z apparently learned about powders during those two 
years.  His 1999 resume adds something missing from the 1997 
version: ‘working knowledge of wet and dry BW [biological 
warfare] agents . . . .’”59  The column concluded by again 
chastising the FBI for failing to properly investigate these 
earlier incidents for links to the 2001 attacks.60
The Times published Kristof’s next column dealing with 
the anthrax attacks one week later on July 19, but it was 
primarily limited to discussing the reported security breaches 
at the USAMRIID labs at Fort Detrick.  Mr. Z was mentioned 
in passing, but only to explain “what piqued [Kristof’s] interest 
in U[SAMRIID] in the first place.”61  Kristof did not write of 
Mr. Z again until after the Attorney General identified Dr. 
Hatfill as a “person of interest” on August 6, 2002 and Dr. 
Hatfill himself held a press conference disavowing his guilt on 
August 11.62  On August 13, 2002, when Kristof next wrote 
about the anthrax attacks, he focused exclusively on Dr. 
Hatfill.63   
Kristof began the August 13 column by “com[ing] clean 
on ‘Mr. Z’” and identifying him as Dr. Hatfill, but urging his 
readers to maintain a presumption of innocence because “[i]t 
must be a genuine assumption that he is an innocent man 
caught in a nightmare.  There is not a shred of 
traditional . . . evidence linking him to the attacks.”64   Much of 
the rest of the column reiterated the circumstantial evidence 
already compiled, however, Kristof did add several new bits of 
information.   Among this was the only physical evidence 
against Hatfill—Kristof reported that specially trained 
bloodhounds, which had been given scent packets taken from 
the anthrax letters “responded strongly to Dr. Hatfill, to his 
apartment, to his girlfriend’s apartment and even to his former 
  
 58 Kristof, The Anthrax Files I, supra note 7. 
 59 Id.  
 60 Id.  
 61 Kristof, Case of the Missing Anthrax, supra note 7. 
 62 For the text of Hatfill’s initial press conferences see Text of Hatfill’s 
Statement (Aug. 11, 2002), http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0,3566, 
60124,00.html. 
 63 Kristof, The Anthrax Files II, supra note 7. 
 64 Id.  
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girlfriend’s apartment, as well as to restaurants that he had 
recently entered . . . . The dogs did not respond to other people, 
apartments or restaurants.”65
Kristof went on to question why it took the FBI so long 
to bring in the bloodhounds, or to read Hatfill’s unpublished 
novel, “Emergence,” which depicts a biological attack on 
Congress.66  Kristof also called attention to several apparently 
false claims on Hatfill’s resume, namely, “a Ph.D. degree, work 
with the U.S. Special Forces [and] membership in Britain’s 
Royal Society of Medicine.”67  The column concluded by 
crediting the FBI for “pick[ing] up its pace” and noting that 
“[p]eople very close to Dr. Hatfill are now cooperating with the 
authorities, information has been presented to a grand jury, 
and there is reason to hope that the bureau may soon be able to 
end this unseemly limbo by either exculpating Dr. Hatfill or 
arresting him.”68  Despite Kristof’s optimistic prediction, the 
Amerithrax investigation remains unsolved and the FBI has 
yet to arrest Dr. Hatfill or anyone else in connection with it.69
III.  HISTORY OF HATFILL V. NEW YORK TIMES 
On June 18, 2003, shortly before the statute of 
limitations was to run with respect to Kristof’s July 2002 
columns, Dr. Hatfill filed a complaint in Virginia state court 
against Kristof and the Times claiming that the four columns 
from July and August 2002 defamed him.  Taking advantage of 
Virginia’s tolling statute, Dr. Hatfill preserved the viability of 
his claims but never proceeded with his state action, instead 
taking a voluntary non-suit in March 2004.70  He then 
commenced an action in the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Virginia on July 13, 2004.71
  
 65 Id.  The bloodhounds apparently made a positive identification of Dr. 
Hatfill’s scent after smelling the decontaminated anthrax letters.  Dr. Hatfill explained 
that the only identification was a friendly reaction that one dog had when Dr. Hatfill 
reached down to pet him.  Thompson, supra note 4. 
 66 Kristof, The Anthrax Files II, supra note 7.  For a more detailed discussion 
of Dr. Hatfill’s novel, see Ted Bridis, Hatfill Novel Depicts Terror Attack, ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, Aug. 14, 2002, available at http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/bioter/ 
hatfillnovelterror.html. 
 67 Kristof, The Anthrax Files II, supra note 7. 
 68 Id. 
 69 See Editorial, The Anthrax Metaphor, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 2005, at A24. 
 70 Hatfill v. New York Times Co., 33 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1129, 1132 (E.D. 
Va. 2004), rev’d, 416 F.3d 320 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1619 (2006).  
 71 Id. 
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A.   Dismissal by the District Court 
Dr. Hatfill’s federal complaint purported to state three 
causes of action against both Kristof individually and the 
Times. Count I claimed that Kristof’s five columns, taken as a 
whole, stated or implied that Dr. Hatfill was responsible for the 
anthrax mailings, thereby falsely imputing to him homicidal 
conduct, and that Kristof and the Times intended the columns 
to convey this message.72  Count II asserted an independent 
claim of libel based on a number of “discrete untruths” 
purportedly contained in Kristof’s columns.73  Count III of the 
complaint claimed IIED.74  After being served, Kristof and the 
Times moved the court, pursuant to Rule 12(b), to dismiss the 
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, and as to Kristof, because the court lacked personal 
jurisdiction over him.75  As to Count I, the court framed the 
issue before it as: 
[W]hether the challenged columns reasonably can be read to accuse 
Hatfill of actually being the anthrax mailer, based upon 
consideration of the full content of the columns and upon the context 
in which they were published, i.e., as a series of opinion pieces 
appearing on the Op-Ed page of a national newspaper.76
Despite the fact that Kristof’s columns raised a number of 
questions about Dr. Hatfill and accurately described him “as 
the overwhelming focus of the [FBI’s] investigation,” the court 
failed to find that they endorsed a belief in his guilt.77  Nor did 
it find that a reasonable reader would have viewed the columns 
as intending to defame Dr. Hatfill.78  “Because the columns 
specifically and repeatedly disavow[ed] any conclusion of guilt,” 
the court rejected Dr. Hatfill’s contention that they were 
written in such a manner as to impute his responsibility for the 
  
 72 Id. 
 73 Id.   
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. at 1130.  Kristof argued that he had insufficient contacts with the state 
of Virginia to allow a court sitting in that state to exercise jurisdiction over him 
without violating his constitutional right of due process.  Id. at 1137-38. 
 76 Hatfill, 33 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1133. 
 77 Id. at 1134. 
 78 Id. (citing White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 F.2d 512, 519 (D.C. Cir. 
1990) (citations omitted)).  The court required a finding of such intent because 
innuendo, rather than a direct accusation, supported the claim of defamation.  Id. 
(citing Chapin v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 993 F.2d 1087, 1110 (4th Cir. 1993)). 
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anthrax mailings in the minds of reasonable readers.79  Based 
on these findings, the court dismissed Count I of the 
complaint.80  
Having found that Kristof’s columns collectively failed 
to be capable of defamatory meaning, the district court had 
little difficulty in ruling that each of the several “discrete 
untruths” alleged by Dr. Hatfill independently failed to convey 
such meaning.81  Since even according to the complaint, the 
allegedly false statements “simply reinforce[d] the purported 
inference that Hatfill is the anthrax mailer,” the court 
dismissed Count II, ruling as a matter of law that such 
statements could not independently support a separate claim 
for libel.82
The court began its analysis of Count III by noting that 
Virginia law considered IIED to be a traditionally disfavored 
claim.83  Although the court did not elaborate on why this was 
so, it cited to Barret v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., which 
explains that Virginia courts disfavor IIED and similar torts 
because of their speculative nature and tendency to presume 
harm.84  The court continued by explaining that in order to 
state a claim for IIED under Virginia law, a plaintiff must both 
plead and prove by clear and convincing evidence four distinct 
elements: (1) that the defendant acted intentionally or 
recklessly; (2) that the conduct complained of was outrageous 
and intolerable; (3) that such conduct caused plaintiff 
emotional distress; and (4) that the emotional distress suffered 
  
 79 Id. at 1134-35. 
 80 Id.  
 81 Hatfill, 33 Media L. Rep. at 1135-36.  The allegedly false statements in 
question were that Hatfill had the “ability to access and motive to send the anthrax”; 
that he had access to an “isolated residence” around the time of the attacks and “gave 
Cipro . . . to people who visited the [residence]”; that he had “up to date” anthrax 
vaccinations; that he “failed 3 successive polygraph examinations”; that he was “upset 
with the United States Government for a period preceding the anthrax attack”; and 
that he “was once caught with a girlfriend in a biohazard ‘hot suite’ at Fort 
Detrick . . . surrounded only by blushing germs.”  Id. at 1136. 
 82 Id.  As an additional ground for dismissing Count II, the court held that 
the claim was barred by Virginia’s one year statute of limitations.  Noting that the 
second cause of action was not alleged in Dr. Hatfill’s original state court complaint, 
the court determined that Dr. Hatfill was unable to take advantage of Virginia’s tolling 
statute as to that claim, and was thus barred from bringing it in federal court after the 
one year statute of limitations had run.  Id. at 1135. 
 83 Id. at 1136 (citing Ruth v. Fletcher, 377 S.E.2d 412, 415 (Va. 1989); Barrett 
v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262, 269 (4th Cir. 2001)). 
 84 240 F.3d at 269 (citing Ruth v. Fletcher, 377 S.E.2d 412, 415 (Va. 1989); 
Bowles v. May, 166 S.E. 550, 555 (Va. 1932)).  See also infra Part IV. 
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was severe.85  Finding that Dr. Hatfill’s pleading failed to prove 
outrageous conduct and severity of harm, as well as that the 
IIED claim was duplicative of the defamation claim, the court 
dismissed Count III as well.86   
Hatfill’s complaint failed to satisfy the district court 
regarding two of the four elements required to state a claim for 
IIED.  First, and most significantly, the court declined to find 
that the defendants’ conduct was outrageous and intolerable.87  
Drawing on Virginia precedent, the court explained that for it 
to make such a finding, the conduct in question must be “so 
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go 
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as 
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”88  
The court held that the publication of news or commentary on 
important public matters, like the FBI’s investigation into the 
anthrax attacks, simply could not constitute the type of 
“outrageous and intolerable” conduct needed to support a claim 
for IIED.89  This conclusion finds support in a number of other 
decisions,90 despite the fact that IIED—unlike the overlapping 
  
 85 Hatfill, 33 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1136-37 (citing Russo v. White, 400 
S.E.2d 160, 162 (Va. 1991); Womack v. Eldridge, 210 S.E.2d 145, 148 (Va. 1974)).  
Virginia’s is a common articulation of the tort, mirroring the Restatement version 
which provides: “One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or 
recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such 
emotional distress.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965).  See infra Part 
IV. 
 86 Hatfill, 33 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1137.  
 87 Resolution of the “outrageousness” question is of such significance because 
of its tendency to overshadow all other elements of the tort.  Finding that a defendant 
intentionally engaged in outrageous conduct will generally enable a reviewing court to 
presume the state-of-mind, severity of distress, and causation elements of the tort.  
Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of 
Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 
82 COLUM. L. REV. 42, 47-49 (1982).  The Restatement itself suggests that “[s]evere 
distress must be proved; but in many cases the extreme and outrageous character of 
the defendant’s conduct is in itself important evidence that the distress has existed.”  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j (1965).  See infra Part IV. 
 88 Hatfill, 33 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1137 (quoting Russo, 400 S.E.2d at 162 
(citation omitted)).  This language is taken from a comment to the Restatement.  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).  See infra Part IV. 
 89 Hatfill, 33 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1137. 
 90 See Karen Markin, The Truth Hurts: Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress as a Cause of Action Against the Media, 5 COMM. L. & POL’Y 469, 491 (2000) 
(surveying cases from the 1990’s where media defendants were sued for IIED and 
noting that “[t]he tort . . . does not contain a newsworthiness or public interest defense, 
but when considering such claims . . . some courts seemed to create one”).  See also 
infra Parts IV and V. 
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public disclosure of private facts tort—does not contain an 
inherent “newsworthiness” defense.91
Additionally, the court found that Dr. Hatfill only made 
“conclusory assertions” of suffering the requisite level of 
emotional distress and thus failed to sufficiently plead the 
fourth element of IIED.92  When a defendant’s conduct is 
sufficiently outrageous, courts tend to presume the requisite 
degree of harm.93  Given the district court’s failure to find the 
columns in question “outrageous and intolerable,” it is not 
surprising that it also failed to find that such columns caused 
Dr. Hatfill severe emotional distress. 
As the final ground for dismissing Count III, the court 
found it duplicative of Dr. Hatfill’s defamation claim, and that 
it amounted to an attempt to evade constitutional limits on 
damage awards stemming from a single act of publication.94  
Noting that both Dr. Hatfill’s defamation and IIED claims were 
“expressly and solely based on . . . publication of the [same] 
series of columns,” the court found that the latter claim must 
be dismissed.95  Whether or not a claim for IIED may lie when 
the underlying facts form the basis for another tort is a matter 
in some dispute.  A number of jurisdictions view IIED as a 
“gap-filler” tort that is only available to redress wrongs not 
covered by a traditional area of tort law.96  Others take a 
seemingly opposite view and only allow IIED claims to proceed 
where the elements of another tort are satisfied, thus 
  
 91 See infra notes 203, 216. 
 92 Hatfill, 33 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1137. 
 93 Givelber, supra note 87, at 47-49. 
 94 Hatfill, 33 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1137 (“[A] separate action for [IIED] 
which is premised solely on allegedly slanderous or libelous words themselves[] is not 
only superfluous but impermissibly duplicative.” (quoting Smith v. Dameron, 12 Va. 
Cir. 105, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1879, 1881 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1987))). 
 95 Id. (citing Smith, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA)  at 1881).  All three counts 
against Kristof were additionally dismissed for want of personal jurisdiction.  Id. 
 96 Lowe v. Hearst Commc’ns, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 2d 669, 675 (W.D. Tex. 2006) 
(“I[IED] is a ‘gap-filler’ tort, allowing recovery in the rare instances in which a 
defendant intentionally inflicts severe emotional distress in an unusual manner so the 
victim has no other recognized theory of redress.” (citing Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. 
Zeltwanger, 144 S.W.3d 438, 447 (Tex. 2004))); Idema v. Wager, 120 F. Supp. 2d 361 
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“[A] cause of action for [IIED] should not be entertained where the 
conduct complained of falls well within the ambit of other traditional tort liability.” 
(quoting Sweeney v. Prisoners’ Legal Servs. of New York, 538 N.Y.S.2d 370, 374 (App. 
Div. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted))); Nix v. Cox Enters., Inc., 545 S.E.2d 
319, 325 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (“Publication of allegedly false statements cannot give rise 
to an action for [IIED], because the exclusive legal remedy where published works 
cause injury remains an action for defamation.”), rev’d on other grounds, 560 S.E.2d 
650 (Ga. 2002).  
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essentially relegating IIED to a “parasitic” role as an element 
of a traditional tort’s damages.97  Although Virginia law 
appears somewhat muddled on the issue,98 once the court 
dismissed Dr. Hatfill’s defamation claim, it could have 
proceeded under either of the aforementioned theories in order 
to dismiss the IIED claim.  However, the court’s concern about 
multiple damage awards suggests it viewed the “gap-filler” 
approach as the more constitutionally sound.99  Following his 
resounding defeat in district court, Dr. Hatfill appealed all of 
his claims against the Times to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.100   
B. Reinstatement by the Court of Appeals 
Dr. Hatfill’s claims found a much more receptive 
audience when they were brought before a three-judge panel of 
the Fourth Circuit, a court notoriously unmoved by the familiar 
First Amendment pleas of media defendants.101  In an opinion 
written by Judge Dennis Shedd102 and issued on July 28, 2005, 
the court reinstated all three of Dr. Hatfill’s claims against the 
Times.103   
In its consideration of Count I, the court surveyed 
Virginia defamation law and came to the conclusion that 
  
 97 Harris v. City of Seattle, 32 Media L. Rep. 1279 (W.D. Wash. 2003) 
(Although IIED claims based on unsuccessful libel claims must be dismissed, it is 
improper to dismiss an IIED claim where an actionable tort that accounts for mental 
suffering, such as false light, survives the pleading stage. (citing Dworkin v. Hustler 
Magazine, 867 F.2d 1188, 1193 n.2 (9th Cir. 1989)); Leidholdt v. L.F.P., Inc., 860 F.2d 
890, 893 n.4 (9th Cir. 1988)); Daly v. Viacom, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1125 n.4 (N.D. 
Cal. 2002) (Where libel and false light claims fail to state a cause of action, the 
underlying behavior likewise must fail to state a cause of action for IIED.). 
 98 Compare Smith, 14 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1881 (“[A] separate action for 
[IIED] which is based solely on allegedly slanderous or libelous words themselves, 
is . . . impermissibly duplicative,” because it would allow a plaintiff to circumvent “the 
strictures of modern defamation law.”), with Foretech v. Advance Magazine Publishers, 
Inc., 765 F. Supp. 1099, 1104-05 (D.D.C. 1991) (applying Virginia law and holding that 
although Hustler Magazine  v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), alleviated some of Smith’s 
concerns, an IIED claim cannot stand where a libel claim based on the same 
statements fails “absent a specific factual showing that [a defendant] acted for the 
specific purpose of inflicting emotional distress”). 
 99 See Hatfill, 33 Media L. Rep. (BNA) at 1136-37. 
 100 Being unable to establish personal jurisdiction, Hatfill voluntarily 
dismissed all claims against Kristof individually.  Hatfill v. New York Times Co., 416 
F.3d 320, 329 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1619 (2006). 
 101 See, e.g., Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270 (4th Cir. 1986), rev’d, Hustler 
Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
 102 Chief Judge William Wilkins joined in the opinion, and Judge Paul 
Niemeyer dissented. 
 103 Hatfill, 416 F.3d 320. 
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Kristof’s columns were capable of defamatory meaning in that 
they imputed to Hatfill the commission of a “criminal offense 
involving moral turpitude,” namely the murders of five people, 
for which, if true, Dr. Hatfill could be indicted and punished.104  
Notwithstanding Kristof’s cursory, but oft-repeated statements 
urging his readers to maintain a presumption of innocence as 
to Dr. Hatfill, the court found that “the unmistakable theme of 
Kristof’s columns [was] that the FBI should investigate Hatfill 
more vigorously because all of the evidence (known to Kristof) 
pointed to him,” and that a reasonable reader of the columns 
would likely conclude that Dr. Hatfill was, in fact, the anthrax 
killer.105  The court reinstated Count II as well, finding that the 
district court erred in concluding both that the claim was time-
barred and that the “discrete false statements” were 
independently incapable of defamatory meaning.106
The analysis of Count III began by rejecting as too 
broad the district court’s assertion that “[p]ublishing news or 
commentary on matters of public concern” can never be 
sufficiently extreme or outrageous to satisfy the elements of 
IIED.107  Reiterating its conclusion that Kristof’s columns are 
reasonably read as accusing Dr. Hatfill of being responsible for 
the anthrax attacks, the court found that such an accusation 
could constitute extreme and outrageous conduct.108  
Specifically, if as Dr. Hatfill alleged, the Times intentionally 
published a false accusation of murder without regard for its 
veracity and without allowing for response, extreme and 
outrageous conduct could be found.109  Particularly important to 
the court’s determination was “the notoriety of the case, the 
charge of murder, and the refusal” of the Times to permit Dr. 
Hatfill’s lawyer an opportunity to respond.110   
  
 104 Id. at 330-34 (citing Carwile v. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 82 S.E.2d 588, 
591 (Va. 1954)). 
 105 Id. at 333. 
 106 Id. at 334-35.  The court also rejected the district court’s conclusion that 
the statute of limitations barred Count II.  Id. 
 107 Id. at 336. 
 108 Hatfill, 416 F.3d at 336. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Id.  The court’s treatment of the effects of “notoriety” poses an interesting 
First Amendment dilemma.  Considering that the constitutional protections afforded 
the press are at their apex when commenting on matters of public concern, see Dun & 
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758-59 (1985) (“It is speech 
on matters of public concern that is at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection.” 
(quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (internal 
quotation marks omitted))), courts often privilege such activity, see Robert E. Dreschel, 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: New Tort Liability for Mass Media, 89 
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The court went on to discount the Times’ and the 
district court’s contentions that allowing the IIED claim to 
proceed would allow Dr. Hatfill to evade constitutional 
limitations on defamation actions.   The court reasoned that if 
Dr. Hatfill was unable to meet the constitutional requirements 
for recovery on his defamation claim, he would likely also be 
unable to recover for IIED.111  However, no mention was made 
as to what the basis seemingly was for the district court’s 
concern, namely that the Times would be twice punished for a 
single act of publication.112  Instead the court saw their sole 
duty as determining whether Dr. Hatfill’s complaint alleged 
intentional and outrageous misconduct.113  
The court also found that Dr. Hatfill sufficiently pled 
severe emotional distress because the complaint alleged that 
the columns caused him to “suffer[] severe and ongoing loss of 
reputation and professional standing, loss of employment, past 
and ongoing financial injury, severe emotional distress and 
other injury,” as well as “grievous emotional distress.”114  Like 
the district court, the Fourth Circuit’s treatment of the severity 
of harm element of IIED was typical, in that it was 
overshadowed and seemingly determined by the 
outrageousness analysis.  Sufficiently outrageous conduct 
  
DICK. L. REV. 339, 349 (1985) (“[C]ourts have indicated their sensitivity to 
constitutional interests by noting that intentional infliction claims may interfere with 
the media’s privilege to publish news in the public interest.” (citing Tumminello v. 
Bergen Evening Record, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 1156 (D.N.J. 1978))); Cape Pub’ns v. 
Bridges, 423 So.2d 426, 428 (Fla. App. 1982); Costlow v. Cusimano, 311 N.Y.S.2d 92, 
95-96 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970); see also Dougherty v. Capital Cities Commc’ns, Inc., 631 F. 
Supp. 1566, 1570 (E.D. Mich. 1986) (“[T]he Sixth Circuit has expressly held that under 
Michigan law, [the press] ha[s] a qualified privilege to report on matters of public 
interest.” (internal citations, quotations, and quotation marks omitted)), or at least 
consider it a powerful counterweight to allegations of outrageous or offensive conduct, 
see Markin, supra note 90, at 487 (surveying cases where media defendants were sued 
for IIED in the 1990’s and finding that “[i]n about one-eighth of the cases, courts cited 
First Amendment concerns and generally ruled that the act of publishing the news, 
however shocking the report might be, does not constitute outrageous behavior”).  
Thus, the court’s determination that the anthrax attacks’ “notoriety” helped render the 
Times’ coverage of those attacks tortious seems to run against an important theme of 
First Amendment doctrine.  Yet, undeniably, someone falsely accused of a notorious 
murder will be more outraged than someone falsely accused of petty theft, despite, or 
perhaps because of the fact that the latter crime is of far less public consequence.  This 
conflict demonstrates one of the difficulties of relying on an outrageousness standard to 
determine when otherwise protected speech should subject the speaker to liability.  
Other difficulties created by the outrageousness standard are discussed further in 
Parts IV and V. 
 111 Hatfill, 416 F.3d at 336-37. 
 112 See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text. 
 113 Hatfill, 416 F.3d at 337. 
 114 Id. 
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generally leads courts to presume sufficiently severe harm.115  
The court reversed the district court on each of Dr. Hatfill’s 
claims and remanded the case for further proceedings.116  In a 
brief one page dissent that relied largely on  the reasoning of 
the district court, Judge Paul Niemeyer stated that the claims 
should be dismissed because he found “nothing in the letter or 
spirit of the columns” amounting to an accusation.117
C. Denial of Rehearing En Banc 
After the Fourth Circuit’s reversal, two out of the four 
judges who heard the case had voted to dismiss Dr. Hatfill’s 
claims against the Times, yet all three counts of the complaint 
survived the 12(b)(6) motion.  Hoping they would be able to tip 
the balance in their favor, the Times petitioned the full Fourth 
Circuit for a rehearing en banc.118  Of the twelve judges 
weighing in on whether to grant the rehearing, only six voted 
in favor of doing so.119  Falling just short of producing the 
majority necessary to grant rehearing, the decision of the 
three-judge panel remained intact, as did Dr. Hatfill’s claims.120  
However, the views of the Times, and those of the press 
generally, did enjoy some measure of validation from the panel.  
In a rare move, Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson III, a former 
newspaper editorial page editor, issued a scathing ten page 
dissent from the denial of rehearing.121  The opinion, which 
sounded in clear First Amendment tones, began by stating: 
The panel’s decision in this case will restrict speech on a matter of 
vital public concern. The columns at issue urged government action 
on a question of grave national import and life-or-death 
consequence. . . .  It is worth remembering the context in which the 
columns at issue were published. In the aftermath of the September 
11 attacks, the nation was alerted to the fact that someone was 
  
 115 See supra note 87. 
 116 Hatfill, 416 F.3d at 337. 
 117 Id. at 337-38 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). 
 118 Hatfill v. New York Times Co., 427 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 
126 S. Ct. 1619 (2006). 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Reporter’s Comm. for the Freedom of the Press, Divided Appeals Court 
Won’t Review Libel Suit Decision, Oct. 19, 2005, http://www.rcfp.org/news/2005/ 
1019-lib-divide.html.  Judge Wilkinson wrote another memorable dissent from a denial 
of rehearing involving an IIED claim brought under Virginia law against a media 
defendant.  Falwell v. Flynt, 805 F.2d 484 (4th Cir. 1986) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting).  
His views in that opinion eventually found favor with a unanimous Supreme Court.  
See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
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sending letters laced with anthrax through the mails. The letters 
were not simply directed at public officials but apparently at private 
individuals as well. Those who handled mail on a regular basis were 
concerned for their safety, and even ordinary residents were advised 
to take special precautions when opening their mail. At least five 
people died from anthrax exposure. There was, in addition, worry 
that law enforcement was ineffectual in locating the source of the 
anthrax production and distribution. In other words, both the 
problem and the steps necessary to resolve it were matters of public, 
indeed national, concern.122
Judge Wilkinson clearly felt Dr. Hatfill’s complaint should have 
been dismissed and he went on to explain the threats posed by 
allowing these types of meritless claims to survive early 
dismissals.  Acknowledging that the Times likely possessed the 
resources to defend its interests in lengthy court battles, Judge 
Wilkinson worried that many other smaller daily and weekly 
newspapers within the Fourth Circuit did not: “[t]he prospect 
of legal bills, court appearances, and settlement conferences 
means that all but the most fearless will pull their punches 
even where robust comment might check the worst impulses of 
government and serve the community well.”123  Judge 
Wilkinson’s concern was justified, as historically, plaintiffs 
have sued smaller news outlets quite frequently, despite their 
presumably shallow pockets.124
Regarding the IIED claim, Judge Wilkinson was “quite 
at a loss” to see how publishing Kristof’s columns was utterly 
intolerable in a civilized community, since they reported on 
“matters of unquestioned public interest with urgent national 
security implications.”125  According to Wilkinson, “[t]he First 
Amendment expressly specifies that the ‘civilized community’ 
in which we live is one that encourages public commentary of 
this type.”126  The dissent went on to explain how the anthrax 
attacks and the government’s responses to them were “at the 
heart of a legitimate public inquiry” and how the Times, by 
publishing critical, albeit hard-hitting, columns regarding this 
inquiry was merely doing its job, “a job that the Constitution 
protects,” and that it was inappropriate for a federal court to 
  
 122 Hatfill, 427 F.3d at 253-54 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). 
 123 Id. at 255. 
  124 See, e.g., Markin, supra note 90, at 501 (“One might anticipate that most 
[of the IIED] cases [from the 1990’s] stemmed from the acts of the stereotypic 
aggressive network television news reporter.  Such was not the case.  More than half 
involved newspapers, some of them quite small.”). 
 125 Hatfill, 427 F.3d at 258 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). 
 126 Id. 
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“construe gray areas of Virginia law to punish [that job] and 
deter others from performing it.”127   
Judge Wilkinson’s eloquent dissent, while no doubt 
appreciated by the Times, did not prevent their 12(b)(6) motion 
from ultimately failing and their case from being remanded 
back to the district court.128   While the Times may eventually 
prevail in its case, the decision of the Fourth Circuit remains.  
What precedential value it acquires remains to be seen, but as 
noted by Judge Wilkinson, the court’s readiness to accept that 
commentary “on a subject of unquestioned public interest” 
could support a claim for IIED constitutes a marked departure 
from the overwhelming trend of case law.129   
IV. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS 
A detailed discussion of the development and 
implications of the tort of IIED is beyond the scope of this Note, 
and has already been ably undertaken in a number of works 
committed solely to that endeavor.130  Nevertheless, a brief 
history helps lay the foundation for what is this Note’s focus, 
namely, application of the tort against the media pursuant to 
their coverage of matters of public concern.  The goal of this 
section is to demonstrate that IIED is an extraordinarily vague 
and undeveloped tort.  Given the tort’s ambiguity, and the First 
Amendment’s need for clear principles by which to adjudicate 
disputes regarding protected speech, this section argues that 
this area of the law needs greater clarity.  While the Supreme 
Court offered some clarification in Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 
many questions remain unanswered.     
A. The Rise of the Tort of Outrage 
The general recognition of IIED as an independent 
cause of action, sometimes referred to as “prima facie tort” or 
“outrage,” is a relatively recent development in the law.131   
  
 127 Id. at 258-59. 
 128 The Supreme Court denied the Times’ petition for a writ of certiorari.  126 
S. Ct. 1619 (2006).   
 129 Hatfill, 427 F.3d at 258 (Wilkinson, J., dissenting). 
 130 See, e.g., Givelber, supra note 87; Calvert Magruder, Mental and 
Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1936); William 
Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874 
(1939). 
 131 The English case of Wilkinson v. Downton is generally credited as the first 
time that a court allowed recovery for emotional distress independently of an 
 
2006] TERROR, TORT, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 259 
Legal scholarship, more than court action, spurred this 
development.132  It was a 1936 article written by Professor 
Calvin Magruder  in the Harvard Law Review that first noted 
that courts had “in an ad hoc manner, and perhaps not very 
scientifically . . . in large measure afforded legal redress for 
mental or emotional distress in the more outrageous cases, 
without formulating too broad a general principle.”133  
Magruder saw this judicial recognition as a preliminary stage 
in the evolution toward accepting the idea that: 
[O]ne who, without just cause or excuse, and beyond all the bounds 
of decency, purposely causes a disturbance of another’s mental and 
emotional tranquility of so acute a nature that harmful physical 
consequences might be not unlikely to result, is subject to liability in 
damages for such mental and emotional disturbance even though no 
demonstrable physical consequences actually ensue.134
Shortly after the Magruder article, Professor William Prosser 
wrote that “[i]t is time to recognize that the courts have created 
  
established cause of action.  2 Q.B. 57 (1897).  The court in that case, attempting to 
achieve a just result in the absence of precedent, awarded damages to a woman who 
suffered permanent physical harm as a result of an ill conceived prank, in which the 
defendant erroneously informed her that her husband had broken both his legs in a 
horrible accident.  Id. at 58-61; see also WILLIAM K. JONES, INSULT TO INJURY: LIBEL, 
SLANDER, AND INVASIONS OF PRIVACY 19 (2003).  In the following decades, recovery for 
emotional distress was occasionally allowed in other circumstances, but only when, like 
Mrs. Wilkinson, such distress was embodied by actual physical harm.  See Magruder, 
supra note 130, at 1045-48 (surveying and discussing some of the more colorful early 
cases).  The prevailing view regarding recovery of purely emotional damages was aptly 
summarized by Lord Wensleydale in a frequently repeated passage from Lynch v. 
Knight: “Mental pain or anxiety the law cannot value, and does not pretend to redress, 
when the unlawful act complained of causes that alone.”  See id. at 1033 (citing Lynch 
v. Knight, Eng. Rep. 854, 863 (1861)).  Yet, compensation for emotional distress 
unaccompanied by physical pain was allowed, if pled “parasitically” as an element of 
damages of another established cause of action.  See id. at 1049 (The original 
Restatement provided that “emotional distress caused by the . . . tortious conduct which 
is the cause thereof is taken into account in assessing the damages recoverable by the 
other.” (citing RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, TORTS § 47(b) (1934))); see also Terrance C. 
Mead, Suing Media for Emotional Distress: A Multi-Method Analysis of Tort Law 
Evolution, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 24, 28 & n.20 (1983) (listing authorities).  However, this 
situation would not endure the test of time and reason, for as astute legal scholars of 
the day correctly observed, “[t]he treatment of any element of damage as a parasitic 
factor belongs essentially to a transitory stage of legal evolution.  A factor which is to-
day recognized as parasitic will, forsooth, to-morrow be recognized as an independent 
basis of liability.” See Magruder, supra note 130, at 1049 (quoting 1 STREET, THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 470 (1906)).  Despite the fact that all jurisdictions 
now appear to technically recognize IIED as an independent tort, 2 ROBERT D. SACK, 
SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS §13.6, at 13-45 (3d ed. 
2005), many continue, in practice, to treat the tort parasitically, see supra text 
accompanying notes 96-98. 
 132 Givelber, supra note 87, at 42.  
 133 Magruder, supra note 130, at 1035. 
 134 Id. at 1058.  
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a new tort.  It appears . . . in more than a hundred 
decisions . . . It is something very like assault.  It consists of the 
intentional, outrageous infliction of mental suffering in an 
extreme form.”135  While acknowledging that attempting to 
ascertain the ultimate limits of this evolving tort was 
doubtlessly a “matter of conjecture,” Prosser observed that 
when courts find liability in this area, it is because the 
defendant has intentionally sought to inflict emotional distress 
on a particularly vulnerable plaintiff.136
Some years after Professor Magruder’s first tentative 
definition of the principle behind compensating emotional 
distress, the American Law Institute, in its Restatements, 
developed what is now the commonly accepted articulation of 
the tort of IIED: “One who by extreme and outrageous conduct 
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to 
another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if 
bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily 
harm.”137  IIED is now universally recognized as a cause of 
action by the states, and virtually all jurisdictions follow the 
Restatement’s four element formulation.138    
  
 135 Prosser, supra note 130, at 874. 
 136 Id. at 888.  In the early cases, successful plaintiffs were almost universally 
women, in part because of the then prevailing view that “[t]here is a difference between 
violent and vile profanity addressed to a lady, and the same language to a Butte miner 
and a United States marine.”  Id. at 887.  However, the noble protection of a lady’s 
sensibilities only extended so far, as the courts had proved unwilling “to compensate 
the silly, hysterical fright of a woman at the approach of a man dressed up in feminine 
clothing.”  Id. at 888 (citing Nelson v. Crawford, 81 N.W. 335 (Mich. 1899)).  
Furthermore, claims seeking “damages for mental distress and humiliation on account 
of being addressed by a proposal of illicit intercourse” were also denied, “the view 
being, apparently, that there is no harm in asking.”  Magruder, supra note 130, at 
1055.  However, at the time “it [was] not altogether certain how long the chivalry of the 
southern courts [could] stand the strain” of allowing such propositions to go 
unpunished.  Prosser, supra note 130, at 889. 
 137 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965); Givelber, supra note 87, 
at 42.  The Institute first acknowledged the cause of action in its 1948 supplement to 
the original Restatement, which provided that “[o]ne who, without a privilege to do so, 
intentionally causes severe emotional distress to another is liable (a) for such 
emotional distress, and (b) for bodily harm resulting from it.”  Id. at 43 & n.7 (quoting 
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW, SUPPLEMENT, TORTS § 46 (1948)). 
 138 These four elements are: (1) extreme or outrageous conduct, (2) conduct 
was intentional or reckless, (3) conduct caused emotional distress, (4) the emotional 
distress was severe.  SACK, supra note 131, at § 13.6.  Rhode Island imposes the 
additional requirement that the conduct in question have caused some form of physical 
harm as well.  See Clift v. Narragansett Television, L.P., 688 A.3d 805, 813 (R.I. 1996).  
For a comprehensive list of decisions recognizing the tort in various jurisdictions see 
SACK, supra note 131, at § 13.6 at 13-45; Markin, supra note 90, at 472 n.17. 
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As was the case in Hatfill, the question often centers 
around outrageousness,139 and whether “the conduct [was] so 
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go 
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as 
atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”140  
In a passage aptly characterized as a “strange description of a 
rule of law,”141 the Restatement explains that “[g]enerally, the 
case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average 
member of the community would arouse his resentment 
against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, ‘Outrageous!’”142    
As a general matter, this passage is troubling because it 
appears to hinge civil liability on the “passion and prejudice of 
the moment,” thus frustrating a central goal of due process.143  
Using the outrageousness standard to judge speech further 
compounds the problem, given the First Amendment’s doctrinal 
“hostility to overbreadth and vagueness,” and its requirement 
that courts “look beyond the case at hand to the effects that 
liability might have on other speakers.”144  Supreme Court 
jurisprudence makes clear the constitutional dilemmas 
provoked when unclear rules of state law restrict First 
Amendment freedoms.145
This definitional vagueness combines with a general 
lack of judicially created limitations to make IIED potentially 
applicable in an extraordinarily broad range of settings.  As 
Chief Judge Judith Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals 
  
 139 See supra note 87.  
 140 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965).  
 141 Givelber, supra note 87, at 52.  
  142 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965). 
 143 Givelber, supra note 87, at 52. 
  144 David A. Anderson, First Amendment Limitations on Tort Law, 69 BROOK. 
L. REV. 755, 771 (2004).  See also Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) 
(“‘Outrageousness’ in the area of political and social discourse has an inherent 
subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of the 
jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular 
expression.”). 
 145 See, e.g., Coates v. City of Cincinatti, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971).  In Coates, 
the Court held that a city ordinance was “unconstitutionally vague because it subjects 
the exercise of the right of assembly to an unascertainable standard, and 
unconstitutionally broad because it authorizes the punishment of constitutionally 
protected conduct.”  Id.  The Court continued, “[c]onduct that annoys some people does 
not annoy others. Thus, the ordinance is vague . . . in the sense that no standard of 
conduct is specified at all. As a result, ‘men of common intelligence must necessarily 
guess at its meaning.’”  Id. (citing Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 
(1926)).  IIED’s outrageousness standard seems equally vague, as the activity 
prohibited is “outrageous conduct [which the Restatement explains] is conduct that is 
outrageous.”  See Givelber, supra note 87, at 53. 
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observed, “[t]he tort is as limitless as the human capacity for 
cruelty.”146  However, protecting emotional tranquility must at 
times give way, when doing so would abridge another’s 
constitutional rights.147  This situation can and frequently does 
arise when the otherwise-protected speech of one citizen 
disturbs the emotional tranquility of another.148  Given its wide 
dissemination and often controversial nature, the speech in 
such situations frequently belongs to members of the media.149  
The following sections discuss the interplay between tort law 
and the First Amendment when plaintiffs sue members of the 
media for IIED. 
B. Outrageous Acts of the Media 
Suits for IIED against media defendants, much to their 
dismay, have steadily increased in the past three decades.  In 
1985, Professor Robert E. Dreschel identified thirty-five cases 
in which plaintiffs alleged IIED as an independent cause of 
action against the media, and noted that all but six had been 
brought since 1978.150  Terrance C. Mead conducted a survey of 
cases reported in the Media Law Reporter between the years 
1977 and 1981, and found eighteen involving claims of IIED.151  
In 2000, using the same methodology, Dr. Karen Markin found 
ninety-four such cases reported between 1990 and 1999.152  
Between 2000 and 2004 alone, the Media Law Reporter tells us 
that plaintiffs brought claims of IIED against media 
defendants at least fifty-nine times.153  Because of the tort’s 
  
 146 Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 122 (1993).  See also 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. c (2006) (“The law is still in a stage of 
development, and the ultimate limits of this tort are not yet determined.”). 
 147 See generally Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); Richard D. 
Bernstein, Note, First Amendment Limits on Tort Liability for Words Intended to Inflict 
Severe Emotional Distress, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1749 (1985). 
 148 See infra Part IV.B. 
 149 Id. 
 150 Robert E. Dreschel, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: New Tort 
Liability for Mass Media, 89 DICK. L. REV. 339, 346 (1984-1985). 
 151 Mead, supra note 131, at 32-33 & n.52. 
 152 Markin, supra note 90, at 478.  
 153 Botts v. New York Times Co., 106 F. App’x 109 (3d Cir. 2004); Hussain v. 
Palmer Commc’ns, Inc., 60 F. App’x 747 (10th Cir. 2003); Yohe v. Nugent, 321 F.3d 35 
(1st Cir. 2003); Riley v. Harr, 292 F.3d 282 (1st Cir. 2002); Worrell-Payne v. Gannett 
Co., 49 F. App’x. 105 (9th Cir. 2002); Ruffin-Steinback v. dePasse, 267 F.3d 457 (6th 
Cir. 2001); Zeran v. Diamond Broad., 203 F.3d 714 (10th Cir. 2000); Lynch v. Omaha 
World-Herald Co., 300 F. Supp. 2d 896 (D. Neb. 2004); Harris v. Seattle, 315 F. Supp. 
2d 1105 (W.D. Wash. 2004); Hatfill v. New York Times Co., 33 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 
1129 (E.D. Va. 2004), rev’d, 416 F.3d 320 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1619 
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indeterminate scope, the increase in IIED suits justifiably 
creates worry amongst the press, who necessarily report on 
highly disturbing and controversial matters.154
The cases in which members of the media have been 
sued for IIED can roughly be divided into two categories—those 
in which the allegedly outrageous conduct stemmed from 
actions taken in gathering, or in some instances, making the 
news, and those cases in which the allegedly outrageous 
  
(2006); Albright v. Morton, 321 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D. Mass. 2004), aff’d, Amrak Prods., 
Inc. v. Morton, 410 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2005); Marks v. Seattle, 32 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 
1949 (W.D. Wash. 2003); Garrett v. Viacom, 31 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2433 (N.D.W. Va., 
2003); Gales v. CBS Broad., Inc., 269 F. Supp. 2d 772 (S.D. Miss. 2003), aff’d, 124 F. 
App’x 275 (5th Cir. 2005); Muzikowski v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 31 Media L. Rep. 
(BNA) 2601 (N.D. Ill. 2003); Collier v. Murphy, 31 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2159 (N.D. Ill. 
2003); Campoverde v. Sony Pictures Entm’t, 31 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1361 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002); Daly v. Viacom, 238 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (N.D. Cal. 2002); Isbrigg v. Cosmos Broad. 
Corp., 30 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1331 (S.D. Ind. 2002); A.M.P. v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 
216 F. Supp. 2d 933 (D. Minn. 2001); Miracle v. New Yorker Magazine, 190 F. Supp. 2d 
1192 (D. Haw. 2001); Ferris v. Larry Flynt Publ’g, Inc., 29 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1833 
(D. Haw. 2001); Stanley v. Gen. Media Commc’ns, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 701 (W.D. Ark. 
2001); Idema v. Eager, 120 F. Supp. 2d 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Van Buskirk v. New York 
Times Co., 28 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2525 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Mineer v. Williams, 82 F. 
Supp. 2d 702 (E.D. Ky. 2000); Long v. Walt Disney Co., 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 836 (Cal Ct. 
App. 2004); Laird v. Spelling, 30 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1085 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); 
Walker v. Kiousis, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 69 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); Wiley v. AIDS Healthcare 
Found., Inc., 33 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1307 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2004); Clawson v. Saint 
Louis Post-Dispatch L.L.C., 32 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2608 (D.C. Super. Ct. 2004); Smith 
v. Kranert, 28 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2375 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2000); Lewis v. Sunbeam 
Television, 28 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2214 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2000); Collins v. Creative 
Loafing Savannah, 592 S.E.2d 170 (Ga. App. 2003); Nix v. Cox Enters., Inc., 545 S.E.2d 
319 (Ga. App. 2001), rev’d on other grounds, 560 S.E.2d 650 (Ga. 2002); Bahktiernejad 
v. Cox Enters., Inc., 541 S.E.2d 33 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); Crawl v. Cox Enters., Inc., 29 
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1826 (Ga. State Ct. 2001); Steele v. Spokesman-Review, 61 P.3d 
606 (Idaho 2002); Uranga v. Federated Publ’ns, Inc., 29 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1961 
(Idaho 2001), superceded on reh’g by 67 P.3d 29 (Idaho 2003); Tuite v. Corbitt, 830 
N.E.2d 779 (Ill. App. 2005); Delaney v. Int’l Union UAW Local No. 94, 675 N.W.2d 832 
(Iowa 2004); Lane v. Mem’l Press, Inc., 11 Mass L. Rptr. 468 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2000); 
Mitchell v. Baltimore Sun Co., 32 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1819 (Md. Cir. Ct. 2004), rev’d 
on other grounds, 883 A.2d 1008 (Md. Ct. Sp. App. 2005); March Funeral Homes West, 
Inc. v. WJZ-TV Channel 13, Media L. Rep. 2207 (Md. Ct. Sp. App. 2003); Collins v. 
Detroit Free Press, Inc., 627 N.W.2d 5 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001); Shriner v. Flint Journal, 
29 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1525 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 2000); Craver v. Povitch, 32 Media L. Rep. 
(BNA) 2385 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004); Bement v. N.Y.P. Holdings, Inc., 307 A.D.2d 86 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2003); Garns v. Lonsberry, 32 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1907 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2003); Mayhew v. Imus, 30 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1061 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001); Gelbman v. 
Valleycrest Prod., Ltd., 732 N.Y.S.2d 528 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001); Irvine v. Akron Beacon 
Journal, 30 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2008 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002); Conese v. Hamilton 
Journal-News, Inc., 29 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2499 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001); Dominick v. 
Index Journal, 29 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2329 (S.C. Cir. Ct. 2001);  Piper v. Mize, 31 
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1833 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003); Dolcefino v. Randolph, 30 Media L. 
Rep. (BNA) 1161 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001); Cox Texas Newspapers v. Wootten, 59 S.W.3d 
717 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001); Provencio v. Paradigm Media, Inc., 44 S.W.3d 677 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 2001); Doe v. Mobile Video Tapes, Inc., 43 S.W.2d 40 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001); Davis v. 
Star-Telegram Operating, Ltd., 29 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1755 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000). 
 154 Markin, supra note 90, at 473; Dreschel, supra note 150, at 361. 
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conduct was the publication or the broadcast itself.155  Often 
times these categories overlap, most typically when a journalist 
acts in a dubious manner while obtaining material that is later 
published.156  However, when courts find outrageous conduct in 
such situations it is generally based on the conduct of the 
journalists in obtaining the news, rather than the content of 
the news itself.157  This is largely because the First Amendment 
offers much less protection for the media when they are 
pursuing the news than it does when they are disseminating 
it.158  The press have “no special immunity from the application 
of general laws[, nor any] special privilege to invade the rights 
and liberties of others.”159  While the Supreme Court offered 
some protection to newsgathering by upholding the right of the 
press to publish information culled from public records and 
proceedings,160 “the First Amendment has never been construed 
to accord a newsman immunity from torts or crimes committed” 
while in pursuit of a story.161
Constitutional concerns assume a much more prominent 
role when media defendants are sued for IIED based on the 
  
 155 See generally Markin, supra note 90, at 479-91 (dividing IIED claims 
brought against media defendants into those based on newsgathering activity and 
those based on the content of the publication or broadcast).  
 156 See Barrett v. Outlet Broad., Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 726 (S.D. Ohio 1997) 
(television journalists accompanied police to suicide scene, entered house while family 
was forced to wait outside and obtained footage of dead woman that was later 
broadcast on evening news); Miller v. Nat’l Broad. Co., 232 Cal. Rptr. 668 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1986) (news crew accompanied paramedics into plaintiff’s house and filmed her dying 
husband and broadcast footage without plaintiff’s consent); Green v. Chicago Tribune 
Co., 675 N.E.2d 249 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (newspaper journalists photographed plaintiff’s 
dying son and recorded plaintiff’s last words to him, then published photo and last 
words without plaintiff’s consent); Howell v. New York Post Co., Inc., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 
122 (1993) (photographer trespassed on to psychiatric hospital’s property to obtain 
photograph, later published, of plaintiff walking with famous crime victim); Dolcefino 
v. Randolph, 30 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1161 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (reporter used hidden 
video camera to record segment that was later aired of city controller and staff member 
wasting city funds by not working on a work day). 
 157 Barrett, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 747; Miller, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 682; Green, 675 
N.E.2d at 257.  See also KOVR-TV, Inc. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. Rptr.2d 431, 435 
(Cal. Ct. of App. 1995) (although footage was never broadcast, reporter’s conduct of 
approaching young children in their home and informing them that their neighbor had 
murdered her two children and committed suicide and then filming their reaction could 
reasonably be understood by jury as outrageous enough to support claim of IIED).  
 158 Markin, supra note 90, at 479 (citing Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 
(1978); Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 
(1972)). 
 159 Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991) (quoting Associated Press 
v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937)). 
 160 See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
 161 Miller, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 685 (quoting Dietmann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 
245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971)). 
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content of their publications.162  Successful suits against the 
media in these situations are rare,163 especially when the 
subject matter in question rises above the level of mere 
ridicule.164  However, these suits, often pled side by side with 
actions for defamation and invasion of privacy, by far 
constitute the majority of IIED claims brought against the 
press.165  While the content of a disputed publication or 
broadcast is rarely adjudged outrageous, media defendants 
must nevertheless endure the costs and distractions of these 
increasingly common lawsuits, defending against claims 
overwhelmingly proven to be without merit.166  The burden of 
  
 162 See Markin, supra note 90, at 491-92. 
 163 SACK, supra note 131, § 13.6, 13-50 to 13-51. 
 164 See Esposito-Hilder v. SFX Broad., Inc., 236 A.D.2d 186 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1997) (radio show hosts held contest where plaintiff was named “ugliest bride”); 
Murray v. Schlosser, 574 A.2d 1339 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1990) (plaintiff, also a new bride, 
was declared “dog of the week” by DJs and won prize of dog food and collar); Kolegas v. 
Heftel Broad. Corp. (radio show hosts derided plaintiff for marrying wife that had 
“Elephant Man” disease, despite fact that plaintiff paid station to promote festival 
being held to raise awareness of the disease). 
 165 Of the fifty-nine reported cases between 2000 and 2004, supra note 153, 
only eleven were based on something other than content: Lynch v. Omaha World-
Herald Co., 300 F. Supp. 2d 896 (D. Neb. 2004) (plaintiff who “hacked” into defendant 
newspaper’s website claimed that defendant destroyed evidence and acted fraudulently 
in order to obtain criminal conviction against him); Campoverde v. Sony Pictures 
Entm’t, 31 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1361 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (lawyer involved in highly 
publicized adoption proceeding appeared on “The Ricki Lake Show” and claimed that 
he was coerced into signing new contract); Walker v. Kiousis, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 69 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2001) (citizen arrested for drunken driving filed allegedly false complaint 
claiming that arresting officer acted improperly); Lewis v. Sunbeam Television, Inc., 28 
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2214 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 2000) (television station broadcast intercepted 
conversation in which police officer brags to friend about beating up her cheating 
boyfriend); Mitchell v. Baltimore Sun Co., 32 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1819 (Md. Cir. Ct. 
2004) (reporters visited former Congressman in nursing home and refused to leave), 
rev’d on other grounds, 883 A.2d 1008 (Md. Ct. Sp. App.); Shriner v. Flint Journal, 29 
Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1525-26 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 2000) (reporter sued newspaper over 
statements made in the newsroom regarding the termination of reporter’s 
employment); Craver v. Povitch, 32 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2385 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) 
(minor sued “The Maury Povitch Show” after show introduced her to man that 
allegedly raped her); Gelbman v. Valleycrest Prods., Ltd., 732 N.Y.S.2d 528 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 2001) (contestant eliminated from “Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?” claimed that 
he was asked unfair question with multiple correct answers); Piper v. Mize, 31 Media 
L. Rep. (BNA) 1833 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (defendant allowed allegedly defamatory 
underground newspaper to be placed with free periodicals at his place of business); 
Dolcefino v. Randolph, 30 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1161 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001) (reporter 
used hidden video camera to record city controller and staff member waste city funds 
by not working on a work day); Provencio v. Paradigm Media, Inc, 44 S.W.3d 677 (Tex. 
Ct. App. 2001) (media outlet sent postcards falsely claiming to be from the “Texas 
Department of Public Safety” to plaintiff sex offender’s trailer park seeking address 
verification). 
 166 Of the cases surveyed, supra note 153, no final judgments were reported 
where plaintiffs prevailed on a content-based IIED claim, however, there were several 
plaintiff “victories” where such claims survived dismissal and summary judgment 
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defending these suits is heightened by the vague and 
unprincipled standards by which IIED claims are typically 
evaluated.167 The lack of clear standards evidences the 
Restatement’s concession that the tort of IIED is “still in a stage 
of development.”168  This immaturity becomes especially 
apparent when the tort is applied against speech alongside the 
ancient tort of defamation.  Defamation, unlike IIED, is not 
only clearly articulated as a matter of tort law, but also has 
had its constitutional ramifications carefully examined, albeit 
with somewhat complicated results.169  Despite the complex 
constitutional guidelines associated with defamation, would-be 
speakers still know the standards by which their speech will be 
judged and thus the fear of self-censorship is thought to be 
alleviated.170  The same can not be said for IIED. 
C. Preachers, Porn & Public Discourse: The Implications of 
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell 
The constitutional considerations associated with 
defamation actions have, however, to a certain extent 
influenced courts’ resolution of IIED claims.  This influence 
achieved its most famous expression by the Supreme Court in 
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell.171  The dispute giving rise to that 
  
motions.  Marks v. City of Seattle, 32 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1949 (W.D. Wash. 2003) 
(false light based IIED claim survived 12(b)(6) motion where video broadcast of city 
official’s assistant portrayed her as using city-paid rental car for personal use); 
Muzikowski v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 31 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2601 (N.D. Ill. 2003) 
(claim survived 12(b)(6) motion because defendant’s bare assertion that the First 
Amendment provides a defense, while possibly accurate, does not address whether 
plaintiff stated a legally cognizable claim); Uranga v. Federated Publ’ns, Inc., 29 Media 
L. Rep. (BNA) 1961, 1970 (Idaho 2001) (summary judgment on IIED claim reversed 
because based on meritless constitutional and fair report privileges), superceded on 
reh’g, 67 P.3d 29, 35-36 (summary judgment reinstated because “[c]hanging the cause 
of action from invasion of privacy to infliction of emotional distress does not circumvent 
the constitutional protection of the publication”);The Fourth Circuit’s decision in 
Hatfill v. New York Times Co.  is of course another example of an IIED claim surviving 
a motion for early dismissal.  416 F.3d 320, 337 (2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1619 
(2006).  See supra note 10. 
 167 See supra notes 153-61 and accompanying text. 
 168 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. c (1965). 
 169 See Anderson, supra note 144, at 787-88 (listing cases and describing “the 
phalanx of constitutional rules limiting defamation”).  
 170 See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 159 (1979) (explaining that the Court’s 
defamation jurisprudence “rested primarily on the conviction that the common law of 
libel gave insufficient protection to the First Amendment guarantees . . . and that to 
avoid self-censorship it was essential that liability for damages be conditioned on the 
specified showing of culpable conduct by those who publish damaging falsehood”). 
 171 485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
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decision concerned a lewd ad parody of televangelist Reverend 
Jerry Falwell published in the pages of Hustler, a pornographic 
men’s magazine.172  Falwell, an admitted public figure, sued 
Hustler and its publisher, Larry Flynt,173 for invasion of privacy 
under Virginia statute, defamation, and IIED.174  When the 
case came before the Supreme Court on certiorari from the 
Fourth Circuit, only the IIED claim was at issue.175  The Court 
unanimously ruled that the parody was not actionable and 
found for Flynt and his magazine.176  
Observers see the Falwell decision primarily as the 
Court’s clarification and reiteration of the “actual malice” 
standard, and the reasons giving rise to that standard, 
pronounced in New York Times v. Sullivan.177  Rejecting the 
Fourth Circuit’s focus on outrageousness and Flynt’s stated 
  
 172 Id. at 48.  The parody contained a fictionalized interview where Falwell 
described his “first time” as a “drunken incestuous rendezvous with his mother in an 
outhouse.”  Id.  For a detailed discussion of the decision and its implications, see Robert 
C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, 
Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 601 
(1990); Rodney A. Smolla, Emotional Distress and the First Amendment: An Analysis of 
Hustler v. Falwell, 20 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 423 (1988).  See also Catherine L. Amspacher & 
Randal Steven Springer, Note, Humor, Defamation and Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress: The Potential Predicament for Private Figure Plaintiffs, 31 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 701 (1990) (expressing concern over the ability of private figure plaintiffs 
to protect their emotional well being after Falwell). 
 173 For an interview with Larry Flynt regarding his First Amendment legacy, 
see Clay Calvert & Robert Richards, Larry Flynt Uncensored: A Dialogue With the Most 
Controversial Figure in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 9 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 159 
(2001).  For an interview with Flynt’s attorney, see Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, 
Alan Isaacman and the First Amendment: A Candid Interview with Larry Flynt’s 
Attorney, 19 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 313 (2001). 
 174 Falwell, 485 U.S. at 47-48. 
 175 Id. at 48-49.  The district court had dismissed the privacy claim, because 
although the Hustler parody had used Falwell’s name and likeness, it had not done so 
“for purposes of trade” within the meaning of the statute that Falwell sued under.  
Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir. 1986), overruled, Hustler Magazine v. 
Falwell, 485 U.S. 45 (1988).  The jury found for Flynt and Hustler on the defamation 
claim, “finding that no reasonable man would believe that the parody was describing 
actual facts about Falwell.”  Id. 
 176 Falwell, 485 U.S. at 47, 57.  Justice Kennedy took no part in the decision 
and Justice White filed a brief concurring opinion.  Id. 
 177 376 U.S. 254 (1964).  See, e.g., Post, supra note 172, at 612; Smolla, supra 
note 172, at 435 (describing Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Falwell: “[I]n both 
letter and spirit, he was reaffirming New York Times with relish.”).  New York Times 
held that a public official could not recover “damages for a defamatory falsehood 
relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 
‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of 
whether it was false or not.”   New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 
(1964).  Subsequent cases extended the actual malice requirement to defamation 
claims brought by “public figures,” as opposed to just public officials.  Curtis Publ’g Co. 
v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967); Associated Press v. Walker 389 U.S. 28 (1967). 
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intent to “assassinate” Falwell’s integrity,178 the Court held 
that public figures and public officials could not recover for the 
tort of IIED stemming from publications such as the Falwell 
parody without additionally demonstrating that the publication 
contains a false statement of fact made with “actual malice, i.e., 
with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless 
disregard as to whether it was true.”179  Because the 
statements at issue were not reasonably capable of being 
perceived as statements of fact, the Court reversed the jury 
verdict against Hustler and Flynt.180   Thus, the ultimate rule 
emerging from Falwell, the only instance in which the Supreme 
Court has attempted to reconcile the tort of IIED and the First 
Amendment, is a narrow one, and has been criticized as 
offering little guidance beyond the particular circumstances of 
the case.181  Nevertheless, the Court discussed the concept of 
“outrageousness,” found it an inappropriate standard to 
determine liability in the area of “political and social 
discourse,” and ultimately rejected it as a guide for judging 
speech about public persons.182   
The decisions of the lower courts over the past eighteen 
years, whether mentioning Falwell or not, seem largely in 
agreement that speech on matters of public concern should not 
give rise to liability for IIED.  Despite the multitude of IIED 
claims challenging such speech during this period, successful 
plaintiffs are conspicuously lacking.183  The courts considering 
these claims utilized a variety of approaches but generally 
reached the same conclusion and found liability in such 
situations inappropriate.  Some courts found reporting on 
newsworthy events simply unable to constitute outrageous 
conduct;184 others determined the plaintiff bringing the suit was 
  
 178 Falwell v. Flynt, 797 F.2d 1270, 1273, 1275 (4th Cir. 1986), overruled, 
Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).  
 179 Falwell, 485 U.S. at 56.  The court maintained that this holding was “not 
merely a ‘blind application’ of the New York Times standard,” but rather reflected their 
“considered judgment that such a standard is necessary to give adequate ‘breathing 
space’ to the freedoms protected by the First Amendment.”  Id.  
 180 Id. at 57. 
 181 See Post, supra note 172, at 614-15 & n.66. 
 182 Falwell, 485 U.S. at 55.  
 183 See Hatfill v. New York Times Co., 427 F.3d at 253, 258 (4th Cir. 2005) 
(Wilkinson, J., dissenting) (“The panel offers no decision from Virginia or any other 
state that holds a news report on a subject of unquestioned public interest to be an 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.”). 
 184 Brown v. Hearst Corp., 54 F.3d 21, 27 (1st Cir. 1995) (news segment 
implying plaintiff murdered his missing wife was not outrageous because segment 
consisted of generally accurate coverage of a legitimate news story); Ross v. Burns, 612 
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a public figure unable to prove actual malice;185 while still 
others found the conduct in question possibly outrageous, but 
held the First Amendment nevertheless protected the 
defendant from liability.186   Many other courts considering 
IIED claims failed to undertake any real substantive analysis 
at all and instead merely reiterated the Restatement test before 
concluding, without explanation, that the plaintiff failed to 
meet it.187
In some respects, the current situation parallels the 
condition present when Professors Magruder and Prosser first 
noted that the courts, without clearly articulating their 
reasons, recognized that plaintiffs had an interest in their 
emotional wellbeing independent from any other interest.  
  
F.2d 271, 274 (6th Cir. 1980) (publishing photos and identity of undercover police 
officer with headline “Know Your Enemies” not outrageous—publishing photos taken 
in public place in conjunction with “news story” cannot be “extreme and outrageous”); 
Hatfill v. New York Times Co., 33 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1129, 1137 (E.D. Va. 2004) 
(“[p]ublishing news or commentary on matters of public concern simply cannot be 
deemed . . . outrageous”), rev’d, 416 F.3d 320 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 
1619 (2006); Dougherty v. Capitol Cities Commc’ns, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1566, 1576 (E.D. 
Mich. 1986) (“reporting on . . . matters of legitimate public interest . . . without actual 
malice . . . cannot be . . . extreme and outrageous”); Crawl v. Cox Enters., 29 Media L. 
Rep. (BNA) 1826, 1830 (Ga. State Ct. 2001) (publishing witness’ name in connection 
with noteworthy crime is not outrageous because it is accurate news account of event of 
public concern).  See also Van Buskirk v. New York Times Co., 28 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 
2525, 2528 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (writing a letter claiming plaintiff lied about committing 
war crimes found not to be outrageous). 
 185 See, e.g., Worrell-Payne v. Gannett Co., 49 F. App’x. 105 (9th Cir. 2002); 
Harris v. Seattle, 315 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1111 (W.D. Wash. 2004); Isgrigg v. Cosmos 
Broad. Corp., 30 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1331 (S.D. Ind. 2002); Steele v. Spokesman-
Review, 61 P.3d 606, 610 (Idaho 2002); Garns v. Lonsberry, 32 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 
1907, 1909 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003); Conese v. Hamilton Journal-News, Inc., 29 Media L. 
Rep. (BNA) 2499, 2502 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001).  See also Lane v. Mem’l Press, Inc., 11 
Mass. L. Rptr. 468 (Super. Ct. 2000) (finding it unlikely that allegations concerning 
public officials could ever be extreme and outrageous). 
 186 See, e.g., Citizen Publ’g Co. v. Miller, 115 P.3d 107, 110, 115 (Ariz. 2005) 
(en banc) (conceding that letter to editor published in newspaper that called for readers 
to randomly execute local Muslims in order to win war in Iraq was outrageous, but 
finding it protected by the First Amendment as political speech). 
 187 The analysis of the Tenth Circuit in Hussain v. Palmer Commc’ns, Inc. 
typifies this approach.  60 F. App’x 747 (10th Cir. 2003).  In that case, plaintiff’s 
digitally altered photo was aired on defendant’s news program and plaintiff was falsely 
identified as being sought by authorities in connection with the 1995 Oklahoma City 
bombing.  Id. at 748-49.  After explaining the Restatement test, the court’s entire 
substantive analysis of the IIED claim consisted of the following:  
After careful review, we find nothing in the record which indicates that the 
defendants behaved in such an extreme or outrageous manner towards 
Hussain as to impose liability for [IIED].  There is no evidence in the record 
to indicate that the plaintiff could prove that the defendants’ conduct 
qualified under any of these standards.   
Id. at 754. 
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Likewise courts considering IIED claims, aware of the time 
honored principle “that speech on public issues occupies the 
highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values, and 
is entitled to special protection,”188 have found ways, “in an ad 
hoc manner, and perhaps not very scientifically”189 to protect 
the media from liability for IIED when they are fulfilling their 
constitutional role. 
Despite this piecemeal recognition of a newsworthiness 
defense, absent binding precedent in a given jurisdiction, 
courts are under no obligation to shield speech on matters of 
public concern from liability for IIED.  The Fourth Circuit’s 
decision in Hatfill evidences this.190  Furthermore, the variety 
of techniques being employed by the courts creates great 
uncertainty as to how any given claim will be adjudicated.  
Considering the widespread distribution of modern media 
product, this creates a significant impediment to effectively 
evaluating the potential liability of a given publication and can 
lead to self-censorship, a central fear of First Amendment 
doctrine.191  “Having to evaluate the liability schemes of fifty 
jurisdictions imposes a considerable burden on speech itself, 
quite apart from the actual effects of those schemes.”192  This 
situation is in need of remedy, and “[a]lthough there is little 
evidence that [IIED] will ever provide the basis for principled 
adjudication” as a matter of tort law, the First Amendment is 
capable of imposing requirements so that the principled 
adjudication of claims against protected speech is possible.193  
Such constitutional requirements appear most clearly in the 
  
 188 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 
(1985) (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982); Carey v. 
Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)). 
 189 See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
 190 A district court already relied upon this decision as grounds for refusing to 
dismiss an IIED claim, albeit in an almost factually identical case concerning a 
separate article written about Dr. Hatfill in Vanity Fair.  See Hatfill v. Foster, 401 F. 
Supp. 2d 320, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), rev’d on other grounds, 415 F. Supp. 2d 353 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).  
 191 See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Pub. Co., 486 U.S. 750, 759 
(1988) (identifying self censorship as a “major First Amendment risk[] associated with 
unbridled licensing schemes”); Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, Inc., 475 U.S. 767, 
789 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (opining that the possibility of an erroneous 
defamation verdict “would create a strong impetus toward self-censorship, which the 
First Amendment cannot tolerate” (quoting Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 
29, 50 (1971) (Brennan, J., plurality)). 
 192 Anderson, supra note 144, at 794.  
 193 See Givelber, supra note 88, at 75. 
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field of defamation law,194 but Falwell demonstrates the 
possibility that similar rules may be adopted and applied in 
other areas of tort law as well. 
V. CONCLUSION 
A. Proposed Newsworthiness Defense 
In Falwell, the Supreme Court questioned the 
constitutionality of judging public discourse by an 
outrageousness standard.195  This inevitably casts doubt on 
using the accepted formulation of IIED to judge public 
discourse, as the Restatement’s four-element test, in practice, 
generally reduces the analysis to the single element of 
outrageousness.196  In order to reconcile IIED with the First 
Amendment, at least to the extent needed to decide Falwell, 
the Court engrafted the actual malice standard onto the 
Restatement test—thus assuring that the Court’s carefully 
crafted protections regarding speech on public figures would 
not be torn down by the emerging tort of IIED.197  
Consequently, one element of public discourse was granted 
constitutional protection from emotional distress claims.  The 
First Amendment’s conception of public discourse, however, 
encompasses more than simply speech about public figures, it 
“embraces at the least the liberty to discuss publicly . . . all 
matters of public concern.”198  The facts giving rise to Hatfill 
make clear the potential of important public matters to draw 
ostensibly private figures into their vortex.199  Yet, the current 
legal framework leaves it to the lower courts to determine for 
themselves how to treat these cases.200  While it is rare indeed 
that a court finds the content of a legitimate news story to be 
outrageous,201 the problem remains that outrageousness, with 
all its inherent vagueness and subjectivity, still governs the 
  
 194 See supra note 183 and accompanying text.  
 195 See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.   Commentators quickly 
echoed this concern.  See, e.g., Smolla, supra note 172, at 446 (“[N]othing could be more 
antithetical to settled first amendment doctrine than the notion that speech may be 
penalized merely for being ‘outrageous.’”).  
 196 See supra notes 87, 140-45 and accompanying text.  
 197 See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text. 
 198 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101 (1940). 
 199 See supra Part II. 
 200 See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text. 
 201 Id. 
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analysis.202  In order to protect the important constitutional 
principles espoused in Falwell, courts considering IIED claims 
based on the content of speech should recognize a 
newsworthiness defense and dismiss plaintiffs’ claims when 
they seek to punish speech on matters of legitimate public 
concern. 
The adoption of a newsworthiness defense to speech-
based torts is by no means a novel idea; the common law 
embraces such a defense with respect to the privacy tort of 
public disclosure of private facts,203 and the Supreme Court 
seemingly accepted, then firmly rejected the defense as applied 
to defamation claims—at least insofar as asserting the defense 
required plaintiffs to prove actual malice, rather than mere 
negligence.204  Neither the common law nor the Court have 
definitively spoken on such a defense for IIED claims; the 
experience of the other speech torts, however, provides 
valuable insight regarding both the applicability and the 
constitutional necessity of such a defense in the IIED context. 
The roots of the public disclosure tort’s newsworthiness 
defense can be traced back as far as 1890, when Samuel 
Warren and Louis Brandeis wrote in their seminal article, The 
Right to Privacy, that “[t]he right to privacy does not prohibit 
any publication of matter which is of public or general 
interest.”205  The current formulation of the public disclosure 
tort, as embodied in the Restatement, provides for liability 
when a defendant publicizes private facts about a plaintiff that 
“would be highly offensive to a reasonable person,” and are “not 
of legitimate concern to the public.”206  Judge Richard Posner 
  
 202 See supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text. 
 203 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1965) (“One who gives 
publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the 
other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be 
highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the 
public.” (emphasis added)). 
 204 The Court, in a plurality opinion written by Justice Brennan, seemingly 
extended the New York Times requirement—that a plaintiff prove actual malice—to 
cases brought by private individuals where the allegedly defamatory speech related to 
matters of public concern.  Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc. 402 U.S. 29, 52 (1971) 
(Brennan, J., plurality opinion).  This state of the law was short-lived, however, for 
three years later, a majority of the Court rejected the proposed extension of the New 
York Times test and held that the Constitution only required a private libel plaintiff to 
prove that the defendant was negligent.  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 
(1974). 
 205 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193, 214 (1890). 
 206 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1965) (emphasis added) 
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explained that these two elements of the tort are largely 
inseparable, as “[a]n individual, and more pertinently perhaps 
the community, is most offended by the publication of intimate 
personal facts when the community has no interest in them 
beyond the voyeuristic thrill of penetrating the wall of privacy 
that surrounds a stranger.”207  Thus, one probably best 
understands the concept of newsworthiness in this context as a 
creature of tort law, mitigating the offensiveness of a given 
disclosure.  While the First Amendment lurks in the 
background whenever tort law seeks to punish speech—public 
disclosure’s newsworthiness defense was conceived as one of 
the tort’s inherent elements, rather than as an explicit 
constitutional prohibition.208
In contrast, the Supreme Court’s flirtation with a 
newsworthiness defense to defamation claims was born wholly 
of First Amendment concerns.  In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 
Inc., Justice Brennan, writing for a plurality, observed that the 
constitutional conceptions of free speech and free press embody 
more than simply the ability to comment upon the affairs of 
public persons.209  Brennan explained that the interest of the 
public centers around public events and a plaintiff’s 
participation in those events, not the plaintiff’s “prior 
anonymity or notoriety.”210  In order to “honor the [First 
Amendment’s] commitment to robust debate on public issues,” 
Brennan thought it necessary to extend constitutional 
protection to all speech on matters of public concern, regardless 
of whether the persons involved were public or private 
figures.211  Just three years later in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 
however, a majority of the court rejected the Rosenbloom 
plurality’s extension of the New York Times test.212  Reasoning 
that private persons were more vulnerable to reputational 
  
 207 Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 208 In explaining the rationale for the defense, Warren and Brandeis discussed 
libel law and the notion of a qualified privilege to discuss matters of public concern, 
specifically topics concerning public figures.  Warren & Brandeis, supra note 205, at 
214-16.  While this concept became a canon of First Amendment doctrine in New York 
Times v. Sullivan, at the time it was merely a concern of tort law.  See 376 U.S. 254.  
Warren and Brandeis’s focus on tort remedies rather than First Amendment 
implications is further evidenced by the fact that they explained the importance of the 
newsworthiness defense by looking to French law, not the Constitution.  Warren & 
Brandeis, supra note 205, at 214-16. 
 209 403 U.S. 29, 41 (1971) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). 
 210 Id. at 43. 
 211 Id. at 41, 43-44. 
 212 418 U.S. 323, 346-47 (1974). 
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injury and more deserving of recovery than public persons, the 
Court found the extension unacceptable.213  Justice Powell’s 
majority opinion also expressed concern about forcing on the 
lower courts the task of determining, on a case-by-case basis, 
what publications concerned matters of legitimate public 
interest.214
At first blush, one might see Gertz as foreclosing the 
possibility of a constitutionally based newsworthiness defense 
for IIED claims.  After all, Falwell was based on New York 
Times215 and Gertz declined to extend New York Times to 
situations involving private persons.  While this argument 
contains a certain logical appeal, it leaves something important 
out of the equation—namely, that defamation and IIED are 
different torts.  While they often apply to the same situation, 
they seek to redress different wrongs, and thus require 
plaintiffs to prove completely different elements.216  The First 
Amendment necessarily requires different things from each.217  
Falwell does not say otherwise, rather, the court explicitly 
noted that its holding was not a “blind application of the New 
York Times standard,” but rather reflected that such a 
standard was needed in the IIED context to provide sufficient 
“breathing space” to First Amendment freedoms.218  The 
problem left unresolved by Falwell and not answered by Gertz 
is that, in IIED claims, publicly important speech involving 
private persons is still judged by an extremely subjective 
outrageousness standard.  In the libel context, such speech 
cannot be the basis for liability, unless a court at the very least 
finds that defamatory statements were published with 
negligence as to their veracity.219  This is a factual finding 
properly left to the jury.  In the IIED context, however, liability 
hinges on whether a given publication leads the jury, as 
representatives of community sentiment, to exclaim 
  
 213 Id. at 345-46. 
 214 Id. at 346. 
 215 See supra notes 177-82 and accompanying text. 
 216 See Smolla, supra note 172, at 439 (explaining why, because of the 
differing objectives of the two torts, it was “logically indefensible” to mechanically and 
literally apply New York Times to IIED claims). 
 217 See Smolla, supra note 172, at 438 (“moving from one tort context to 
another changes not only the elements of the tort cause of action, but also the balance 
of first amendment interests”). 
 218 Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988). 
 219 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347. 
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“Outrageous!”220  This latter test clearly poses different First 
Amendment problems than the former, thus, Gertz’s rejection 
of a newsworthiness defense to defamation claims fails to 
foreclose the possibility of adopting such a defense to IIED 
claims.   
In the context of speech, the elements of IIED parallel 
those of the public disclosure tort to a far greater degree than 
they do those of defamation.  In order for speech to be a 
tortious public disclosure, it must be “highly offensive to a 
reasonable person,”221 whereas in the IIED context tortious 
speech consists of that which is “extreme and outrageous” as 
determined by community sentiment.222  Assuming that the 
community’s sentiments are reasonable, it is difficult to 
differentiate between these two standards in any sort of 
principled manner.223  Because of this, commentators have 
noted the lack of any “logical reason” why a newsworthiness 
defense should apply to one tort action but not the other.224  
While the newsworthiness defense to public disclosure claims 
was conceived in tort law,225 it suffices to protect defendants 
from being punished for exercising their First Amendment 
right to speak on public matters simply because one might find 
their speech “highly offensive.”  Such a defense is likewise 
needed to prevent plaintiffs from using IIED claims to punish 
the press, or any other speaker, simply because their speech on 
public matters could be considered “outrageous” by some.   
“[T]he world of debate about public affairs”226 occupies a 
preeminent role in our constitutional scheme.227  In order to 
adequately safeguard the right to freely engage in this debate, 
  
 220 See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
 221 See supra note 206 and accompanying text. 
 222 See supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text. 
 223 See Dreschel, supra note 150, at 354 (“In fact, the proof requirements of the 
two torts resemble each other rather closely.”).  Although IIED technically requires 
proof of severity of harm and intent to inflict emotional suffering, courts generally infer 
these elements upon finding sufficiently outrageous conduct.  See supra notes 87, 140-
45 and accompanying text. 
 224 Dreschel, supra note 150, at 355.  The First Amendment aside, it seems 
the newsworthiness defense to the public disclosure tort could easily become 
meaningless if a plaintiff could circumvent it simply by recasting their action as a 
claim for IIED.  Id. 
 225 See supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text. 
 226 Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988). 
 227 See, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“Those who won our independence believed . . . that public discussion is a 
political duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American 
government.”). 
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courts considering IIED claims based on the content of speech 
should allow defendants to assert a newsworthiness defense.  
Where the contested speech unquestionably relates to a matter 
of legitimate public concern, the IIED claim should be 
dismissed.  When a court “can determine from the pleadings a 
case-dispositive First Amendment defense,” dismissal is 
appropriate as it protects First Amendment rights and obviates 
the need for an extended, costly, and ultimately futile trial.228  
Despite the concerns expressed by Justice Powell in Gertz, the 
making of this determination seems well within the faculties of 
the judiciary.229  Courts have been undertaking this exact 
inquiry in the context of the public disclosure tort for years.  As 
the Court in Falwell saw the need to borrow a principle of 
defamation law to address the First Amendment threat 
presented by a public figure’s IIED claim, so too should courts 
today borrow a principle from the field of privacy law to 
address the threat presented by the burgeoning numbers of 
IIED claims being adjudicated under an unconstitutionally 
vague standard.  Adopting a newsworthiness defense is not 
merely a “blind application” of a principle of privacy law; rather 
it is necessary to prevent constitutionally protected expression 
from being judged by an inherently subjective standard—thus 
providing adequate “breathing space” for First Amendment 
freedoms.230  
B. Hatfill v. New York Times Revisited 
In Hatfill, the newsworthiness of Kristof’s columns 
placed no formal obligation on the Fourth Circuit to dismiss Dr. 
Hatfill’s IIED claim.  The public importance of Kristof’s subject 
matter was only relevant insofar as it factored into the court’s 
outrageousness analysis.  While the district court believed that 
publishing news or commentary on a matter of legitimate 
concern could never be sufficiently outrageous, the Fourth 
Circuit disagreed.231  In holding that an op-ed piece on such an 
undeniably important item of news could be outrageous, the 
court single-handedly expanded the scope of IIED.232  While a 
  
 228 See Citizen Publ’g Co. v. Miller, 115 P.3d 107 (Ariz. 2005). 
 229 See supra note 214 and accompanying text. 
 230 See supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
 231 See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
 232 See Markin, supra note 90, at 488 (exhaustively surveying IIED claims 
against media defendants in the 1990’s and opining that “[a]t most one can conclude 
that the publication of editorial content, no matter how intrusive into a person’s 
 
2006] TERROR, TORT, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 277 
false accusation of murder is no trivial matter, the law of 
defamation is far better suited to remedy the harm caused by 
injurious falsehood than is the law of IIED.233  Application of a 
newsworthiness defense to IIED claims would not deny remedy 
to one falsely implicated in a crime, any more so than the 
constitutional standards governing defamation already limit 
remedies in such situations.234  Recognition of a 
newsworthiness defense would instead merely prevent an 
unhappy subject of a legitimate news story from punishing 
constitutionally favored speech by suing under a vague and 
ambiguous cause of action.  Recognition of a newsworthiness 
defense would require courts dismiss IIED claims such as Dr. 
Hatfill’s, and would add much needed clarity to this neglected 
area of the law.  Failure to adopt the defense, on the other 
hand, licenses IIED’s continued encroachment into the world of 
public discourse.  The Supreme Court noted in New York Times 
v. Sullivan that “[w]hatever is added to the field of libel is 
taken from the field of free debate.”235  When other torts seek to 
punish speech, the effect of their expansion is no different. 
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